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AMERICA'S (NOT SO) GOLDEN DOOR: ADVOCATING 
FOR AWARDING FULL WORKPLACE INJURY 
RECOVERY TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Long before President John F. Kennedy famously proclaimed 
the United States of America a "nation of immigrants,"1 the Stat-
ue of Liberty stood above New York Harbor as a beacon of our na-
tion's historically rich immigrant background. Since 1886, Lady 
Liberty has triumphantly posed as a proud symbol of freedom, 
refuge, and opportunity. 2 At the base of her iconic pose, Emma 
Lazarus' immortal poem poignantly calls for the world's tired and 
poor, and exhorts them to enter by the "golden door."3 Americana 
symbolism aside, this exhortation has proven quite paradoxical. 
Immigration has provided our country with unquestionable cul-
tural richness, yet, at times, the country's treatment of immi-
grants has contradicted fundamental notions of fairness and de-
cency. 4 In recent decades, the bright light of the Statue of 
Liberty's beacon and its underlying symbol have been dimmed 
and overshadowed by immigration controversy5 and judicial im-
1. President John F. Kennedy, Acceptance Speech for America's Democratic Legacy 
Award at the Anti-Defamation League (Jan. 31, 1963), available at http://archive.adl.org/ 
immigrants/video.html#.U zrtpq ldVb U. 
2. See History of the Statue of Liberty, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY-ELLIS ISLAND 
FOUND., INC., http://www.statueofliberty.org/statue_history.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2014); Statue of Liberty, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL 0RG., http://whc. 
unesco.org/en/list/307 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
3. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 77 (1964); EMMA LAzARus, THE 
NEW COLOSSALS (1883), available at http://xroads.virginia.edu/-cap/liberty/lazaruspoem. 
html. 
4. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 2 (West-Thompson Reuters 7th ed. 2012); see also Jeff D. Holdsworth, Note, In the 
Name of National Security: The Creppy Directive and the Right of Access to Special Interest 
Deportation Proceedings, 3 CREIGHTON INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35, 35 (2012). 
5. Following the astronomical influx of illegal immigration within the last two dec-
ades, a number of states have taken it upon themselves to "'solve a crisis ... [that] the 
federal government has refused to fix"' by passing strict enforcement-based legislation in 
an effort to curb illegal immigration, most notably Arizona SB 1070. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 33. Federal immigration reform has yet to gain sufficient traction to 
transform hopes into reality. Recently, though, the Senate passed S. 744, which proposed a 
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migration enforcement practices, including using one's immigra-
tion status to limit the amount of recoverable workplace injury 
• 6 
compensation. 
Many of today's seven million undocumented workers-roughly 
five percent of America's workforce7-find themselves between a 
rock and a hard place. Many have braved the risks of heat ex-
haustion, dehydration, hypothermia, life-threatening wild animal 
attacks, kidnapping, rape, and death in order to come to the 
United States.8 In fact, studies show roughly 300 to 800 migrants 
die in U.S. territory every year trying to cross the border.9 In most 
cases, these individuals leave behind their homes and family 
members in hope of a better life and an opportunity to pursue the 
"American Dream."10 Even if these individuals successfully make 
it across the border, they still face the increasingly difficult road 
to socioeconomic prosperity. That road frequently begins with the 
harsh reality that the vast majority of available work is in some 
number of effective changes to our federal immigration system, including stronger worker 
eligibility verification standards and border security. Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, Five 
Reasons Immigration Reform Isn't Close to the Finish Line, CNN (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/11/politics/immigration-reform-5-things/index.html?iid=arti 
clesidebar. However, partly because of partisan politics and partly due to attention to-
wards other pressing matters like foreign policy, the national debt ceiling, and the Afford-
able Care Act, comprehensive immigration reform has failed to take substantial steps for-
ward in the House and is not likely to pass in the immediate future. Id.; see also Gregory 
Ferenstein, Immigration Reform Unlikely to Pass Before 2015, Says Rep. Issa, TECH-
CRUNCH, (Jan. 7, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/07/immigration-reform-unlikely-to-
pass-before-2015-says-rep-issa/ (noting that due to partisan animosity it will be difficult to 
reach a compromise in order to pass an immigration reform bill before the next election). 
Notwithstanding these challenges, immigration reform very much remains an "elephant in 
the room" when considering hot-bed American issues. 
6. See infra Part III.C; see also Roxana Mondragon, Injured Undocumented Workers 
and Their Workplace Rights: Advocating for a Retaliation Per Se Rule, 44 COLUM. J.L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 447, 456 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court's Hoffman Plastic decision 
has sparked some prejudicial side effects for undocumented workers, including creating a 
legal basis for employers to pry into immigration status and discouraging undocumented 
workers from seeking to enforce their workplace rights for fear of employer retaliation or 
deportation). 
7. Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Work-
place Immigration Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. Rev. 59, 65 (2006) 
(citing JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 2 (Mar. 2005), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf). 
8. Alex Peiia, Migrants Face Higher Risks fllegally Crossing the Border, NBC LATINO 
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://nbclatino.com/2012/09/20/migrants-face-higher-risks-illegally-cross 
ing-the-border/. 
9. Id. 
10. See Sonia Nazario, Op-Ed., The Heartache of an Immigrant Family, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2013, at A27. 
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of the most dangerous professions in the country, 11 with the 
frighteningly high possibility of death, 12 or at minimum, the high 
probability of a debilitating workplace injury during employ-
ment.13 
When the high risk of injury in these dangerous jobs becomes 
reality, these undocumented workers face another daunting ob-
stacle. Injured and unable to work, they are left with the difficult 
task of seeking workplace injury recovery knowing that because 
they are not citizens, their potential recovery-if any-will be se-
verely limited due to their immigration status. 14 In this very real 
sense, the narrow issue of workplace .injury recovery for illegal 
immigrants displays a microcosm of America's oxymoronic immi-
gration history. The undocumented worker heeds Lady Liberty's 
outward exhortation for the world's tired and poor to find relief 
and opportunity through the "golden door," only to find that such 
relief is selectively given. 
From one perspective, limiting workplace injury recovery on 
the basis of one's immigration status may appear sensible. After 
all, wouldn't allowing illegal immigrants to recover full damages 
for workplace injuries incentivize further illegal immigration? 
Moreover, why should we award illegal immigrants damages for 
injuries if they are neither citizens nor lawful permanent resi-
dents? While the reasoning underlying this position is not com-
pletely without merit, this comment will demonstrate that an-
swers to these questions are not so straightforward. Indeed, this 
comment counterintuitively argues that awarding full damages to 
illegal immigrants who suffer workplace injuries better serves the 
United States' federal immigration objectives. 
11. REBECCA SMITH, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, IMMIGRANT WORKER'S ENTITLEMENT 
TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION POST-HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS V. NLRB 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter NELP REPORT], available at http://nwjp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/lmm 
igrant-Workers-Entitlement-to-Workers-Comp-9-7-10-by-Smith.doc; see AFL-CIO, IMMI-
GRANT WORKERS AT RISK: THE URGENT NEED FOR IMPROVED WORKPLACE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 9 (2005) [hereinafter AFL-CIO REPORT], available 
at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l02l&context=laborun 
ions. 
12. NELP REPORT, supra note 11, at 1, 3. In 2012, 708 Hispanic or Latino workers 
were killed from work-related injuries-more than thirteen deaths per week, or nearly two 
Latino workers killed every day of the year. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
& HEALTH ADMIN., Commonly Used Statistics, https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/common 
stats.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
13. NELP REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see AFL-CIO REPORT, supra note 11, at 3. 
14. See infra Part 111.C. 
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Part II of this comment discusses the history and current state 
of recovery for injured illegal immigrants by examining the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), traditional avenues 
of workplace injury relief, and the seminal Supreme Court deci-
sion Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. u. NLRB. Part II also 
briefly comments on United States Senate Bill 7 44 (''S. 7 44"), the 
recently proposed comprehensive immigration legislation, and its 
treatment of undocumented workers. Part III discusses both 
IRCA and Hoffman Plastic's applicability and effect on workplace 
injury recovery for illegal immigrants, revealing that while most 
courts have refused to completely prohibit the recovery of damag-
es, many courts have used immigration status to limit the type 
and amount of damages recoverable. Part IV analyzes, and then 
challenges, the practice of limiting workplace injury recovery on 
the basis of immigration status. This comment argues that 
awarding full damages to undocumented workers supports our 
federal immigration objectives and is sound policy. Part IV closes 
by noting that implementing change to the current federal immi-
gration laws ought to occur solely through the procedures pre-
scribed by the Constitution. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act 
IRCA is currently the prevailing federal immigration law gov-
erning illegal immigrant employment. Passed in 1986, one of 
IRCA's main purposes was to address some of the issues that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA") failed to ad-
dress, 15 illegal immigration being one such prominent issue. IRCA 
seeks to reduce and deter illegal immigration by tightening bor-
der security and strengthening interior enforcement. With regard 
to the latter, one of IRCA's primary moves is to make it unlawful 
for an employer "to hire ... an alien knowing the alien is an un-
15. The INA was primarily concerned with preserving the national origins quota, es-
tablishing a system of preferences for skilled workers and immediate relatives of U.S. citi-
zens and permanent resident aliens, and improving security and screening procedures. 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 19. However, the INA failed to address, either in the 
initial legislation or in the 1965 Amendments, illegal immigration and, specifically, the 
employment of illegal immigrants. See generally id. at 19-21, 25 (noting that IRCA was 
the first federal legislation to make it illegal to hire an illegal alien). 
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authorized alien."16 IRCA also makes it illegal for an employer to 
continue to employ an already-hired alien after becoming aware 
that the alien is unauthorized. 17 Furthermore, IRCA requires em-
ployers to verify the immigration status of a prospective employee 
prior to hire. 18 IRCA does provide, however, a good-faith defense 
for employers who are otherwise compliant, but hired illegal im-
migrants based on the employee's tendering of false or fraudulent 
work authorization documents. 19 
IRCA necessarily emphasizes deterrence of illegal immigration 
via the employer, as employers ultimately hold the keys to em-
ployment for illegal immigrants.20 The operative rationale was 
that if employers eliminate the availability of jobs for illegal im-
migrants, supply and demand would sooner or later eliminate the 
incentive to immigrate altogether. 
It is important to note, however, that whether intentional or 
not, IRCA does not criminalize an illegal immigrant's mere pres-
ence in the United States.21 Nor does IRCA expressly prohibit an 
illegal immigrant from gaining or maintaining employment in the 
United States.22 IRCA simply prohibits an employer from know-
ingly hiring unauthorized aliens.23 While the prudence of this dis-
tinction may be debated, it has not proven to be a trivial one. 
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A) (2012). 
17. Id. § 1324a(a)(2). 
18. Id. § 1324a(b)(l)(A). This employment verification requirement has recently been 
facilitated by an electronic verification database commonly known as E-Verify. However, 
E-Verify is far from being universally employed. See infra notes 198-201. 
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3). 
20. See generally id. § 1324a(a)(l)(A)-(a)(2), (a)(6)(C), (b) (noting that most of the re-
sponsibilities in the statute are centered on obligating the employer to refrain from hiring 
illegals, continuing to employ illegals once an alien's status is disclosed, and obligating the 
employer to verify immigration status in the hiring process). 
21. See id. § 1324a. Nowhere in the statutory text does it contain the phrase "illegal 
immigrants may not be employed" or any similar phrase. Id. In this sense, the term "ille· 
gal immigrant",is somewhat of a misnomer because presence in the United States without 
proper documentation is only a civil offense. See Jose Antonio Vargas, Immigration De-
bate: The Problem with the Word Illegal, TIME (Sept. 21, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/ 
2012/09/21/immigration-debate-the-problem·with-the-word-illegal/. 
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
23. Id. § 1324a(a)(l). 
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B. Traditional Remedies for Workplace Injury 
Workplace injury is typically governed and administered by the 
state or jurisdiction in which the injury was sustained. Before the 
rise of workers' compensation protection, which gained wide-
spread traction in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 24 the 
main recourse for an injured worker to receive compensation for 
his injury was through tort law.25 Today, seeking compensation 
through tort litigation is often "untenable for undocumented 
workers [because they] often lack the resources to initiate litiga-
tion, have limited English proficiency, and fear the immigration 
consequences of appearing in court."26 Nevertheless, some undoc-
umented workers attempt to gain compensation through common 
law tort claims despite the many obstacles they face. Tort claims 
are only occasionally successful, and even when they are, the 
worker's immigration status often limits the type and amount of 
damages or benefits they receive from litigation.21 
For these reasons, workers' compensation law has virtually 
preempted the desirability of pursuing a common law tort claim 
against an employer for a workplace injury. 28 Workers' compensa-
tion, as opposed to tort law, is a "no-fault" structured law that 
varies slightly by jurisdiction, but has a universally similar pur-
pose and function: obligating employers to compensate an injured 
24. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX. K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW§§ 
2.07-2.08 (2012). 
25. See MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 863 (2005); see 
also Debra T. Ballen, The Sleeper Issue in Health Care Reform: The Threat to Workers' 
Compensation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1994) (explaining that the workers' com-
pensation system arose in the context of increased injuries resulting from the Industrial 
Revolution and that before workers' compensation, injured workers had to file law suits to 
receive compensation). 
26. Mandragon, supra note 6, at 455 (quoting Brief for the New Orleans Worker's 
Center for Racial Justice et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *11-12, Bol-
linger Shipyards, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 604 F.3d 864 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-60095), 2009 WL 
6706826); see also CRAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 863 (explaining that the shift towards 
workers' compensation occurred because recovery under the tort system hinged on deter-
minations of fault and causation and not under need). Fearing the immigration conse-
quences of appearing in court cannot be underestimated. Some undocumented workers 
who suffer workplace injury-even those workers whose injuries stem directly from their 
employer's negligence-elect not to risk being subjected to removal proceedings by having 
their true immigration status become known. See Mondragon, supra note 6, at 471-72. 
27. See infra Part IIl.C. 
28. Steven G. Biddle & Mary Jo Foster, When Is Workers' Compensation the Exclusive 
Remedy in Sexual Harassment Cases?, ARIZONA ATI'ORNEY, Dec 1996, available at http:// 
www.azbar.org/AzAttorney; see Mondragon, supra note 6, at 454-55. 
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employee for his or her injury irrespective of how or why the inju-
ry occurred.29 The employer can provide this relief in one of three 
ways: self-insuring, purchasing private insurance, or participat-
ing in a state administered workers' compensation fund. 30 Howev-
er, whether the employer provides this relief directly out of pock-
et, indirectly through an insurance carrier, or through 
participation in a state workers' compensation fund, the employer 
is still the party responsible for compensating for the injury.31 
Although workers' compensation strictly burdens employers to 
pay for any injury that occurs under their watch, regardless of 
circumstance, this is a necessary tradeoff for employers. Under 
workers' compensation schemes, employers avoid the expense and 
delay of litigation32 and also avoid the potentially ruinous econom-
ic losses stemming from injured employees who bring successful 
tort claims.33 Moreover, requiring employers to shoulder the bur-
den of an employee's injury properly incentivizes the employer to 
promote and maintain a safe workplace. 
There are a number of types of relief available for injured 
workers through workers' compensation. These include payment 
of medical bills, monetary compensation for the injury itself 
(which also works as a lost wages substitute), temporary total 
29. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 24, at§ 1.01; CRAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 875. 
Workers' compensation laws stemmed from a dilemma that accompanied the rise of indus-
try in America. Id. at 861. Flowing naturally from the increase of industry in the United 
States was the increase of workplace accidents. Id. ("The Workers' Compensation system 
developed in the early twentieth century in response to rising rates of industrial accidents 
and their devastating economic consequences for workers disabled or killed on the job and 
their dependents."). Increased litigation of these accidents uncovered a problem for both 
employees and employers. First, many workers were unable to recover due to a number of 
judicially created affirmative defenses that employers could claim. Id. at 868; see also 
Ballen, supra note 25, at 1292. But, if plaintiffs could overcome these defenses, employers 
became subject to debilitating liability costs outside of their individual insurance coverage. 
Id. Workers' compensation seemingly resolved this dilemma by allowing more workers to 
recover irrespective of fault and by ensuring that the employer's liability costs were not 
ruinously damaging. 
30. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 876. 
31. See id. In the case of an employer who is insured, the "out-of-pocket" expenses 
may not be as direct of a reality as is workplace injury compensation for employers who 
are either self-insured or non-insured. Nevertheless, either directly, or indirectly through 
increased insurance premiums, the employer will still feel the effect of this obligation. 
32. See Mondragon, supra note 6, at 455. 
33. Ballen, supra note 25, at 1292. 
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disability benefits, partial disability benefits, and permanent dis-
ability benefits. 34 Sometimes the relief might be some manner of 
vocational rehabilitation benefit, like training for a new job.35 
Typically, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") will hear an in-
jured worker's dispute about compensability or benefits. 36 If either 
the worker or the employer deems that the ALJ's decision in the 
hearing was erroneous, they may appeal to the state workers' 
compensation appeals board.37 The board's decision may be ap-
pealed to the state's general courts of appeal. 38 In many cases, 
however, a worker's claim for benefits is not contested and is set-
tled without the need for administrative or judicial intervention.39 
Workers' compensation statutes have generally allowed recov-
ery of benefits to injured undocumented workers as most states 
have either expressly or impliedly found that illegal immigrants 
are covered within the definition of "employee" for purposes of 
workers' compensation.40 Nevertheless, even if the injured undoc-
umented worker files his or her workers' compensation claim in 
one of the jurisdictions that allows recovery to illegal immigrants, 
he or she faces a real possibility that such damages will be lim-
ited due to his or her illegal status.41 
C. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 
The Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB has unquestionably and pro-
foundly impacted many sub-issues of workplace rights for illegal 
immigrants, including workplace injury.42 Before Hoffman Plastic, 
34. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 875-76. 
35. Id. at 876. 




40. See infra Part III.B. As a general matter, workers' compensation laws only bar 
benefits to otherwise illegal immigrants "if (1) the employee knowingly and willfully made 
a false representation as to his or her physical condition; (2) the employer relied on the 
representation and the reliance was a substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) there was a 
causal relation between the false representation and the injury." 3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX 
K LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 66-1 (2013} (emphasis added). 
41. See infra discussion Part IIl.C. 
42. 535 U.S. 137 (2002); Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 
659, 661 (2012). 
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the Supreme Court first confronted the issue of a potential con-
flict between employment law and federal immigration policy in 
Sure-Tan, Inc. u. NLRB. 43 In Sure-Tan, a pair of undocumented 
workers had been terminated and reported to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, the primary immigration enforce-
ment body at that time, in retaliation for union involvement. 44 
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") ordered the em-
ployer to reinstate the undocumented workers and award them 
backpay because the termination was in violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").45 The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the NLRB's order and held-foreshadowing the holding 
in Hoffman Plastic-that the NLRB's order to award backpay and 
reinstate the illegal immigrants was precluded by federal immi-
gration policy.46 
Ironically, Hoffman Plastic did not address workplace injury 
law at all;47 rather, in the case, an illegal immigrant had been 
terminated from his employment due to union activity48 and the 
Court once again limited the recovery of lost wages. 49 The Court 
reasoned that awarding full recovery of lost wages would contra-
dict the nation's immigration objectives.50 
The facts of Hoffman Plastic were as follows. In May 1988, Jose 
Castro was hired to operate various machines for Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. ("Hoffman").51 Before Hoffman hired him, "Cas-
tro presented documents that appeared to verify his authorization 
to work in the United States."52 Later, Castro and several other 
employees were laid off due to their involvement in a union or-
ganizing campaign.53 Some years later, the NLRB discovered that 
Hoffman had intentionally laid off these employees, including 
43. 467 U.S. 883, 886 (1984). 
44. Id. at 88&-87. 
45. Id. at 889. 
46. Id. at 898, 903-05. 
47. See generally Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. 137. 
48. Id. at 140. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 151. 
51. Id. at 140. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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Castro, and did so "in order to rid itself of known union support-
ers," a violation of the NLRA. 54 The NLRB then ordered Hoffman 
to offer reinstatement and backpay to these employees.55 
The ALJ who presided over the compliance hearing determin-
ing the amount of backpay owed to each affected employee dis-
covered that Castro had never been legally authorized to work in 
the United States.56 Castro subsequently admitted to tendering 
false work authorization documents. 57 The ALJ found that the 
Board was precluded from awarding either reinstatement or 
backpay because doing so would contradict Sure-Tan. 58 Four years 
later, the NLRB reversed the ALJ's decision with respect to back-
pay, however, on the grounds that "the most effective way to ac-
commodate and further the immigration policies embodied in 
[IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] 
to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other em-
ployees."59 
A divided Supreme Court reversed the NLRB's backpay and re-
instatement order, holding that allowing the Board to award 
backpay to illegal aliens would contradict explicitly stated federal 
immigration goals.60 The majority, in an opinion authored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily on the plain language of 
the Court's opinion in Sure-Tan, concluding that Sure-Tan's ex-
press limitation of backpay to aliens "not lawfully entitled to be 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 140-41. 
56. Id. at 141. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 141 (alteration in original) (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 
N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is interesting and 
somewhat surprising to note that the primary federal agency over immigration at that 
time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), allied with the NLRB on certio-
rari, arguing that the award of backpay should be upheld because the INS had conceded 
that ''border enforcement alone could not stop undocumented immigrants from entering 
the country in search of work." Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocu-
mented Immigrants 373-74 (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 82, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809205. With this position, the INS was endorsing 
"further efforts to reduce the employment magnet." Id. at 374. However, the positions of 
the INS came as quite the shock to Justice Scalia, as he so energetically expressed during 
oral argument. See id. at 378. 
60. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 151. 
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present and employed in the United States" foreclosed the award 
of backpay to Castro. 61 
The Court held that under IRCA, "it is impossible for an un-
documented alien to obtain employment in the United States 
without some party directly contravening explicit congressional 
policies."62 Chief Justice Rehnquist said "[e]ither the undocu-
mented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts 
the cornerstone of IRCA's enforcement mechanism, or the em-
ployer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in direct contra-
diction of its IRCA obligations."63 The majority correctly pointed 
out that Castro's claim for backpay was invalid given that Con-
gress had "expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to 
obtain employment with false documents."64 However, the Court 
did not limit its decision to Castro's specific circumstance, but 
broadly held that awarding backpay to illegal immigrant workers 
"trivializes the immigration laws, [and] also condones and en-
courages future violations."65 The Court also held that because 
Castro was unable to work legally in the United States-also a 
liberal interpretation of IRCA-he was consequently unable to 
mitigate damages.66 Because awarding backpay to illegal aliens 
would "unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical 
to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA," the Su-
preme Court reversed the NLRB's decision to award Castro back-
pay damages.67 
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, challenged the majori-
ty's holding as flawed. First and foremost, the dissent questioned 
the majority's contention that awarding backpay would condone 
future IRCA violations. Justice Breyer found the NLRB's position 
persuasive-that awarding backpay to illegal immigrant workers 
does "not interfere with the implementation of immigration poli-
cy. Rather, [awarding backpay] reasonably helps to deter unlaw-
61. Id. at 145 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). This conclusion was premature, or even erroneous, in light of 
the fact that IRCA never explicitly states that an illegal immigrant may never be em-
ployed in the United States. See supra notes 20-22. Nor does IRCA state that mere pres-
ence is, in and of itself, illegal. See supra notes 20-22. 
62. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 148. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 149. 
65. Id. at 150. 
66. Id. at 150-51; see supra notes 20-22. 
67. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 151-52. 
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ful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to 
prevent."68 Justice Breyer found the backpay award necessary to 
ensure the credibility of law enforcement because such an award 
would "makeO clear that violating the labor laws will not pay."69 
Justice Breyer opined that if employers were not responsible for 
back pay, they could "violate the labor laws at least once with im-
punity,"10 and further explained that the general purpose of 
IRCA's employment prohibition was to diminish the attraction 
that would pull illegal immigrants to the United States.71 Moreo-
ver, Justice Breyer challenged the majority's reliance on IRCA's 
preemptive powers, arguing that IRCA's statutory language does 
not explicitly state how a violation of federal immigration policy 
is to affect other laws, such as the NLRA. 72 Instead, he explained 
that the Court's ruling was based on its belief that it was "neces-
sary ... in order to vindicate what [the Court] sees as conflicting 
immigration law policies."73 
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic, 
questions arose as to its applicability in other areas of employ-
ment.74 Hoffman Plastic was factually limited by virtue of its deal-
ing with two federal laws, IRCA and NLRA. 75 It was also factually 
limited to scenarios in which the illegal immigrant affirmatively 
tendered false work authorization, which is an undisputed viola-
tion of IRCA. 76 However, the apparent breadth of the Court's hold-
ing in Hoffman Plastic seemed to suggest that illegal immigrants 
have no workplace rights. Indeed, the Hoffman Plastic decision 
emboldened many employers to engage in workplace practices 
under a presumption that illegal immigrants have no workplace 
rights.77 
68. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 160-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Lastly, the dissent argued that Chevron def-
erence should have been awarded to the NLRB's decision because its position was at least 
a reasonable one. Id. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
74. See Garcia, supra note 42, at 667-68. 
75. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 140. 
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012); see Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 149. 
77. Mondragon, supra note 6, at 454. 
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D. Senate Bill 7 44 
In 2013, the Senate undertook the arduous task of writing new 
comprehensive legislation-in contrast to the House of Repre-
sentatives' desire for piecemeal amendments to supplant IRCA. 78 
Led by the effort of four Democrats and four Republicans, dubbed 
the "Gang of Eight," the Senate passed S. 744 on June 27, 2013, 
by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two. 79 President Obama charac-
terized S. 7 44's passage as "a critical step" towards fixing the 
country's broken immigration system. 80 While it proposes reforms 
to interior enforcement through improved employment verifica-
tion, the bill's primary focus iss on strengthening the southern 
border and providing a path to citizenship for the eleven million 
illegal immigrants living in the United States.81 
Almost from its outset, Republicans in the GOP-dominated 
House of Representatives opposed the comprehensive approach of 
S. 744.82 The issue that most squarely divides the House Republi-
cans was S. 744's path to citizenship for the illegal immigrants 
currently living within the nation's borders, as some of the Re-
publican caucus views it as an unwarranted amnesty for individ-
uals who have broken the law.83 Aside from this ideological rift, 
the bill faces a number of hurdles before the House will pass it: 
the sheer number of Republicans in the House, their desire to 
have a piecemeal amendment approach, and their distrust of 
President Obama's policies toward border security all stand in 
the way of easy passage.84 Notwithstanding partisan politics, im-
migration reform has taken a backseat to other pressing issues 
such as raising the debt-ceiling and the roll-out of the Affordable 
Care Act.85 While S. 744 proposes a number of important changes 
78. David Espo & Erica Werner, Broad Immigration Bill Cruising to Senate Passage, 
AsSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/broad-immigration·bill-cruis 
ing-senate-passage-200518755.html. 
79. Alan Silverleib, Senate Passes Sweeping Immigration Bill, CNN (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/27/politics/immigration/. 
80. Id. At least one commentator believes that this legislation (if subsequently passed 
in the House) has the potential to be the crowning legislative achievement of the Obama 
administration's second term. Id. 




85. Bert Eljera, Immigration Reform Takes a Back Seat, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 7, 
2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/immigration-reform-takes-a-back ·seat. 
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to our federal immigration system, IRCA is likely here to stay for 
the near future. 
How would S. 7 44 affect illegal immigrants who are injured in 
the course of their employment? The answer is that, if anything, 
it would provide more protections for the injured illegal immi-
grant. Most of S. 744's proposed changes do not drastically differ 
from the policies in IRCA and certainly do not weaken the en-
forcement provisions of IRCA. 86 For example, S. 744 does not 
touch the provisions of IRCA which make it illegal for an employ-
er to knowingly hire an illegal immigrant or continue to employ 
an illegal immigrant after discovering his or her illegal status, 
thereby maintaining IRCA's burden placement on the employer.87 
S. 744 also maintains the express presumption that if the em-
ployer has hired an illegal immigrant and failed to make an in-
quiry to verify the individual's employment authorization status, 
he or she does so knowingly. 88 
However, in at least one important provision concerning reme-
dies, S. 7 44 affirmatively strengthens the protections granted to 
undocumented workers. Subsection 8 of S. 744 section 3101 states 
that "all rights and remedies provided under any Federal, State, 
or local law relating to workplace rights, including but not limited 
to back pay, are available to an employee despite (i) the employ-
ee's status as an unauthorized alien during or after the period of 
employment."89 
The language of this section is clear and unequivocal. It ex-
pressly states that an employee's immigration status is irrelevant 
to an illegal immigrant's workplace rights under any federal, 
state, or local law.90 Thus, if S. 744 were to pass the House of Rep-
resentatives and become law as written, it would not only re-
endorse the emphasis that IRCA put on the employer for curbing 
employment of illegal immigrants, it would also emphatically bol-
ster an illegal immigrant's workplace rights-specifically his or 
her right to recover in full for a workplace injury. 
86. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012), with S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3101 (2013). 
87. See S. 744 § 3101 ("It is unlawful for an employer-(A) to hire, recruit, or refer 
.... "). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. (emphasis added). 
90. Id.; see also infra Part IV.B (arguing that damages should not be limited by virtue 
of immigration status because this extrinsic characteristic is, in the majority of, if not all, 
instances, irrelevant to the injury suffered). 
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III. IRCA AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC'S APPLICABILITY TO 
\VORKPLACEINJURY 
A. State Courts Have Generally Held that IRCA Does Not 
Preempt an Illegal Immigrant's Right to Workplace Injury 
Recovery 
1383 
For Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Hoffman Plastic majority, 
one of the primary motivations for not allowing Jose Castro to re-
ceive backpay was that federal immigration policies, as expressed 
in IRCA, foreclosed such recovery.91 Notwithstanding this holding, 
the vast majority of states allow illegal immigrants to recover 
damages under state workplace injury law.92 Still, many employ-
ers argue that IRCA preempts these state laws.93 Fortunately, 
most courts that have undertaken the determination of whether 
workplace injury recovery is foreclosed by IRCA's federal immi-
gration policies have refused to find that IRCA preempts state 
law.94 
The constitutional doctrine of federal preemption is derived 
from the Supremacy Clause95 and a finding of preemption is large-
ly determined by congressional intent.96 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that federal laws may either expressly or impliedly 
preempt a state law or state-administered police power.97 Express 
preemption occurs when Congress specifically precludes state or 
local regulation in a particular field.98 In those instances, the fed-
eral law is binding on the states because federal law is supreme.99 
91. See supra Part 11.C. 
92. A number of state workers' compensation statutes explicitly provide coverage to 
illegal immigrants-or persons "whether lawfully or unlawfully employed"-including Ar-
kansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 40, § 66.03[2][a] & nn.4, 7, § 
66.03[2)[b] & n.10, § 66.03[2][c) & nn.12-13, 15. 
93. Id. at§ 66.03[3][a]. 
94. Id. 
95. The Supremacy Clause dictates that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the Unit-
ed States ... shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
96. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540--41 (2001); Gade v. Nat'l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992). 
97. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
98. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 406 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
99. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108 (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)) 
("[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 'any 
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Implied preemption is a little more difficult to define. There are 
two types of implied preemption. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that implied field preemption occurs when "the scheme of 
federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it."'100 The Supreme Court has also recognized that implied con-
flict preemption occurs when "'compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility,' or where state law 
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress. "'101 
Given that workplace injury recovery has traditionally been a 
state-administered remedy, most state courts have been reluctant 
to find that IRCA has the same preemptive powers that the Su-
preme Court found in Hoffman Plastic. 102 Those advocating 
preemption point to IRCA's language in section 1324a(h)(2) which 
states: "The provisions of this section preempt any State or local 
law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through li-
censing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or 
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."103 However, 
some state courts are hesitant to apply this preemption section to 
the workplace injury context because workplace injury recovery, 
generally, does not involve civil or criminal sanctions. 104 
Some courts have refused to hold that IRCA either expressly or 
impliedly preempts state laws governing workplace injury recov-
ery. Courts have dismissed preemption arguments on express 
preemption grounds, reasoning that there is no language in IRCA 
that explicitly states that it preempts state workers' compensa-
state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or 
is contrary to federal law, must yield."'). 
100. Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cues-
ta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
101. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
102. See, e.g., Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Minn. 2003) 
("[W]e conclude that the IRCA was not intended to preclude the authority of states to 
award workers' compensation benefits to unauthorized aliens."); Safeharbor Emp'r Servs. 
I, Inc. v. Velazquez, 860 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (declining to find either 
express or implied preemption and concluding that "the Florida legislature's right to enact 
workers' compensation benefits for illegal aliens is not preempted by federal action"). 
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012). 
104. See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239 (2d Cir. 2006); see 
also Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 403 (Conn. 1998) (rejecting the notion that workers' 
compensation benefits can be considered sanctions because they were intended to compen-
sate a worker for work-related injuries without regard to fault). 
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tion laws. 105 As written, IRCA is silent on the issue of workplace 
injury. 106 For others, a finding of implied field preemption is diffi-
cult given that employment has largely been a state-governed 
remedy.107 For example, the New York Court of Appeals, in Bal-
buena v. !DR Realty LLC, held that states "'possess broad author-
ity under their police powers to regulate the employment rela-
tionship to protect workers within the State' ... includ[ing] the 
power to enact 'laws affecting occupational health and safety."'108 
Other courts have also refused to find conflict preemption because 
awarding damages neither makes compliance with IRCA physi-
cally impossible nor sufficiently stands as an obstacle to its un-
derlying purposes. For example, in Curiel v. Environmental Man-
agement Services, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that 
allowing benefits to injured illegal alien workers in no way con-
flicted with the express purposes of IRCA. 109 
Furthermore, as the determination of preemption hinges on 
congressional intent, Congress made clear that IRCA was not in-
tended to "undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in 
existing law."110 A number of courts have rejected the arguments 
that IRCA preempts state workplace injury laws based on this 
congressional intent.m In conclusion, employers who have at-
tempted to argue that IRCA preempts illegal immigrants from re-
covering damages have usually not prevailed in that argument. 
B. Most Courts Have Refused to Laterally Apply Hoffman Plastic 
to the Workplace Injury Context 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding in Hoffman 
Plastic that illegal immigrants are precluded from receiving 
backpay under the nation's federal immigration objectives, courts 
105. Farmer Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 133 Cal. App. 4th 533, 539 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see Dowling, 712 A.2d at 403-05. 
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
107. See, e.g., Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (N.Y. 2006). 
108. Id. at 1256 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)). 
109. 655 S.E.2d 482, 484 (S.C. 2007) ("[D]isallowing benefits would mean unscrupulous 
employers could hire undocumented workers without the burden of insuring them, a con-
sequence that would encourage rather than discourage the hiring of illegal workers.'). 
110. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5662. 
111. Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., 559 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see Curiel, 
655 S.E.2d at 484 (finding the Ruiz court persuasive in its analysis of congressional intent 
underlying IRCA). 
1386 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1369 
have been reluctant to laterally apply Hoffman Plastic to bar 
workplace injury recovery. Courts have been hesitant to expand 
the breadth of Hoffman Plastic for several reasons. 112 First, the 
majority of state legislatures have made it clear that they prefer 
laws where illegal immigration status does not per se preclude 
recovery for workplace injuries. 113 Second, most courts have not 
found a sufficient causal connection between the injury and an 
individual's immigration status. 114 Lastly, courts have been care-
ful to recognize that Hoffman Plastic's particular factual circum-
stances are not universally applicable to all workplace injury cas-
115 
es. 
Under our federalist system of government, states have consid-
erable police power to regulate and enact laws for their citizens. 
Unquestionably, the reluctance of many state courts to laterally 
apply Hoffman Plastic to the workplace injury context partly 
stems from the fact that the state legislatures have made clear 
their intent not to do so. In traditionally state-governed and 
state-administered arenas, like workplace injury, state courts are 
naturally inclined to give effect to the intent of their own legisla-
ture unless there is a clear federal law which transcends or 
preempts the state law. 116 This inclination is sometimes referred 
to as the "presumption against pre-emption."111 The Supreme 
Court has recognized this principle justifiably exists as a product 
of independent state sovereignty in our federal system and the 
historic primacy of state regulation in matters such as health and 
safety. 118 In all preemption cases, courts must "start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act."119 
Since Hoffman Plastic is not a case about workplace injury, and 
in the absence of any prevailing federal workplace injury law that 
would preempt state laws, state courts apply their own laws and 
112. I have intentionally omitted a preemption argument whose reasoning follows 
identically from Part Ill.A's treatment of IRCA. 
113. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 40, at§ 66.03[2][a] & n.4. 
114. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 224-25 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
115. Solis v. SCA Rest. Corp., 938 F. Supp. 2d 380, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
116. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
117. See id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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give effect to their own law's legislative intent. The response of 
the states on the question of whether illegal immigrants are cov-
ered under their state's workplace injury law has largely been to 
provide coverage. 120 A great number of states' workers' compensa-
tion statutes provide coverage to persons '"whether lawfully or 
unlawfully employed.'"121 Some states define "employee" as includ-
ing "aliens" without reference to legality of employment. 122 Other 
states have allowed recovery because their courts have found "il-
legal aliens" to be included in the definition of covered "employ-
ees" despite the absence of any provision directly on the issue. 123 
In fact, only Wyoming and Idaho expressly prohibit illegal immi-
grants from receiving workplace injury recovery. 124 As one com-
mentator noted, the widespread legislative and judicial practice of 
not completely prohibiting workplace injury recovery because of 
immigration status "has made it possible for courts across the 
United States to determine that immigration status is irrelevant 
to a worker's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits."125 
A second reason that explains why state courts have refused to 
laterally import Hoffman Plastic into the workplace injury con-
text is relevance. Courts have asserted that there is a nonexistent 
or insufficient nexus between a suffered workplace injury and the 
injured employee's immigration status. 126 In other words, one's 
immigration status is largely, if not absolutely, irrelevant to an 
injury suffered at the workplace. In some cases, the relevance ar-
gument prevailed despite the undocumented worker's affirmative 
use of false work authorization or other identification. 121 For ex-
120. See supra note 92. 
121. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 40, § 66.03[2] [a] & n.4. 
122. Id.§ 66.03[2][a] & n.7. 
123. Id.§ 66.03[2][b] & n.10. 
124. Id.§ 66.03[2][c] & n.12-14; see also id.§ 66.03[2][c] & n.15 (noting that Nebraska 
has denied vocational rehabilitation services by virtue of immigration status). 
125. Mondragon, supra note 6, at 457. 
126. See, e.g., Farmer Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 133 Cal. App. 4th 
533, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see also infra Part IV.B. 
127. See Farmer Bros. Coffee, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 543--44. The relevance argument is 
also stronger if the employer's lack of diligence or care in the hiring process becomes an 
intervening cause which overcomes any conceded impropriety on the part of the employee. 
Some courts have used IRCA's unambiguous burden placement on the employer to allow 
illegal immigrants to recover, even if they have used false documentation, and there is not 
a sufficient showing that the employer was compliant in good-faith and relied on that false 
representation. See Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 58 A.D.3d 44, 52-53 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Silva v. Martin Lumber Co., No. M2003-00490-WC-R3-CV, 2003 WL 
22496233, at *2 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2003); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 
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ample, in a California case where an illegal immigrant affirma-
tively tendered false work authorization to the employer-a fake 
Social Security card-the California Court of Appeals held the in-
dividual's employment was the direct result of the false represen-
tation of the individual's immigration status, and not the InJU-
ry. 12a 
Thirdly, apart from the legislative intent and relevance argu-
ments, many state courts have recognized that the particular fac-
tual pattern of Hoffman Plastic is not universally applicable to all 
workplace injury cases. 129 Hoffman Plastic can be distinguished 
on two fronts. First, it specifically dealt with two competing fed-
eral laws, IRCA and NLRA, and this is rarely the case in work-
place injury disputes, whether the claims are based on workers' 
compensation or tort, because workplace injury is a traditionally 
state-administered arena. 130 
Hoffman Plastic can be factually distinguished on a second 
front. In Hoffman Plastic, the illegal immigrant, Jose Castro, af-
firmatively tendered false work authorization to the employer on 
which the employer reasonably relied in the hiring process. 131 Un-
der IRCA, employers who reasonably rely on such false represen-
tation and are otherwise compliant are entitled to a good-faith de-
fense.132 Thus, according to the facts of Hoffman Plastic, the 
Supreme Court reached the correct result in not upholding Cas-
tro's relief from a statutory interpretation point of view. By af-
firmatively tendering false work authorization documents, Castro 
expressly violated IRCA under the language of the statute and 
1002 (N.H. 2005). Using this reasoning, the court opinions seem to reinforce that employ-
ers are only entitled to protection in the instances of an employee's false representation, if 
they have otherwise acted in good faith. Unless an employer can show that they reasona-
bly relied on the documentation and were otherwise compliant in the verification process, 
their lack of diligence or negligence is presumed, and is a superseding intervening cause 
that vitiates the affirmative defense. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 a(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012). 
128. Farmer Bros. Coffee, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 543-44; see also Matrix Emp. Leasing v. 
Hernandez, 975 So. 2d 1217, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding an award of bene-
fits to an undocumented worker who had presented his employer with a false social securi-
ty card in the hiring process). These cases are consistent with the overall purpose of work-
ers' compensation laws which are intended to provide compensation to the injured 
individual regardless of fault and regardless of any intrinsic or extrinsic characteristics of 
that individual. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
129. See, e.g., Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (N.Y. 2006). 
130. See supra Part II.B. 
131. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140-42 (2002). 
132. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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Hoffman was entitled to a good-faith defense, regardless of the 
larger immigration policy concerns. 
It is not so much the result that condemns Hoffman Plastic's 
universal applicability to the workplace injury context, but rather 
the Hoffman Plastic majority's underlying assumptions and rea-
soning. Not every illegal immigrant workplace injury case in-
volves a situation where the undocumented worker affirmatively 
uses false documentation in the hiring process; indeed, the con-
trary is often the case. 133 Moreover, IRCA does not expressly crim-
inalize mere illegal presence in the United States and does not, 
per se, prohibit an illegal immigrant from being employed. 134 
Many state courts have used this ground (that not every work-
place injury case involves an illegal immigrant who has affirma-
tively tendered false work documentation) in refusing to give 
Hoffman Plastic universal applicability. 135 For instance, in Bal-
buena v. IDR Realty LLC, the New York Court of Appeals specifi-
cally stated, "Hoffman [Plastic] is dependent on its facts, includ-
ing the critical point that the alien tendered false documentation" 
during the hiring process. 136 The New York Superior Court, in 
Gomez v. F & T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, also recognized that un-
less the illegal immigrant fraudulently misrepresented his immi-
gration status, which is a direct violation of IRCA, the illegal im-
migrant may not be exposed to criminal prosecution or 
penalties. 137 The Gomez court acknowledged that while "[a]n em-
ployer who knowingly violates the employment verification re-
quirements ... is subject to civil or criminal prosecution," it is 
"[o]nly in situations, unlike the present case, where the worker 
133. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Rous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 
2006); see also Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1250 (finding that the question of work authoriza-
tion documents only arose upon plaintiffs suit following the workplace injury); Gomez v. F 
& T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, 842 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (noting that 
plaintiffs were hired without having to fill out an application for employment or show any 
type of identification). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
135. See, e.g., Madeira, 469 F.3d at 246; Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1258; Gomez, 842 
N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
136. Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1258. The Madeira court also premised a portion of its 
decision on the fact that the illegal immigrant worker had committed no fraud but that "it 
was the employer rather than the worker who knowingly violated IRCA by arranging for 
the employment." 469 F.3d at 223. 
137. Gomez, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
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uses false documents to obtain employment" that the undocu-
mented employee will be subjected to potential criminal prosecu-
tion or penalties. 138 
Thus, while Hoffman Plastic seemed to suggest that illegal 
immigrants have no rights in the workplace, this has not turned 
out to be the case. Many state legislatures have made clear in 
their statutes that immigration status does not preclude recovery 
for workplace injuries. Moreover, courts have noted the lack of 
causal connection between one's immigration status and the re-
spective workplace injury. Lastly, courts have distinguished 
Hoffman Plastic factually from many workplace injury cases. 
C. Notwithstanding !RCA and Hoffman Plastic's Inapplicability, 
a Number of Courts Have Still Used an Illegal Immigrant's 
Status to Limit Workplace Injury Recovery 
Despite the fact that many courts have refused to find IRCA 
preemptory and are likewise reluctant to broadly apply Hoffman 
Plastic to the work injury context, many of these courts have un-
fortunately allowed a worker's immigration status to be taken in-
to account in determining damages. 139 The remaining portion of 
this comment is dedicated to challenging this practice, which has 
so adversely affected the undocumented worker population. 
One of the demonstrative cases using immigration status as a 
basis for limiting workplace injury recovery is Balbuena v. !DR 
Realty LLC.140 In Balbuena, the Court of Appeals of New York 
confronted the issue of whether damages should be limited for an 
undocumented Mexican worker who obtained employment as a 
construction worker but suffered debilitating injuries when he fell 
from a ramp. 141 In Balbuena, the court used a faulty assumption142 
138. Id. at 300--01. 
139. See, e.g., Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1259; Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 
818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); see also Madeira, 469 F.3d at 228 (apportioning part of its deci-
sion to allow recovery on the fact that the jury was able to consider immigration status 
and removability in the damages determination); Mondragon, supra note 6, at 465. ("[Even 
though] the majority of courts have found that Hoffman Plastic does not automatically 
prohibit undocumented workers from obtaining workers compensation benefits or tort 
damages from employers ... the Hoffman Plastic line of reasoning has been used to limit 
the type and amount of benefits and remedies that undocumented workers may claim."). 
140. 845 N.E.2d at 1259. 
141. Id. at 1250. 
142. The court stated that "[w]e recognize ... that plaintiffs' presence in this country 
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to correctly conclude that an individual's immigration status 
standing alone is "insufficient to justify denying plaintiffs a por-
tion of the damages to which they are otherwise entitled."143 Not-
withstanding this and without a clear legal explanation, the Bal-
buena court considered the undocumented worker's immigration 
status relevant for determining damages. 144 Specifically, the court 
opined that, "any conflict with IRCA's purposes that may arise 
from permitting an alien's lost wage claim to proceed to trial can 
be alleviated by permitting a jury to consider immigration status 
as one factor in its determination of the damages."145 
Other courts have more explicitly identified an undocumented 
worker's alleged inability to mitigate damages as the primary jus-
tification for using one's immigration status to limit his or her re-
covery. For example, in Cherokee Industries, Inc. u. Aluarez, the 
Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma held that while illegal aliens 
may not be necessarily barred from recovery under the state 
workers' compensation statute, "[s]ome benefits such as vocation-
al rehabilitation or medical treatment ... may not be available to 
a claimant who cannot stay in this country."146 In Reinforced 
Earth Co. u. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court also held that while Hoffman Plastic does 
not preclude recovery based solely on immigration status, an in-
dividual's undocumented status might justify suspending medical 
benefits for temporary total disability. 147 
without authorization is impermissible under federal law" even though mere unauthorized 
presence itself is not a violation ofIRCA. Id. at 1258; see supra note 21; infra Part N.C.3. 
143. Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1258. 
144. Id. at 1259 (finding immigration status relevant for the determination of damages 
without citing any statute, regulation, binding precedent, or legal doctrine to justify this 
practice). 
145. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit similarly endorsed 
this principle by upholding the district court's consideration of the plaintiffs alien status 
in determining workplace injury recovery. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 
F.3d 219, 248-49 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("[T]he plaintiffs status is not a bar to recovery [but] it may act as a 
factual item to be presented to the trier of fact."). 
146. 84 P.3d 798, 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). 
147. 810 A.2d 99, 108 (Pa. 2002) (assuming that because the claimant cannot apply for 
or accept lawful employment, his loss of earning power is caused by, rather than inci-
dental to, his individual immigration status); see also Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 
N.W.2d 510, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (''We ... hold that the magistrate correctly rea-
soned that when defendant learned of plaintiffs' employment status and could not legally 
retain them as employees or find them other work, plaintiffs became unable to ... perform 
work 'because of the commission of crime within the meaning of [the relevant state stat-
ute which precludes benefits if the worker has committed a crime]."); De Jesus Uribe v. 
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Some jurisdictions have also used this mitigation argument to 
justify limiting damages or benefits not due to an alien's physical 
inability to return to work, but on an alien's legal inability to re-
turn to his or her former position or accept another employment 
offer without violating IRCA. 148 For example, Maine has enacted a 
statutory provision that declares that the inability of an illegal al-
ien to accept a mitigated job offer by virtue of his or her immigra-
tion status is deemed a refusal of the offer. 149 Likewise, a Georgia 
court held that an illegal immigrant was disqualified from receiv-
ing future benefits (be it front pay or medical expenses) due to his 
legal inability to take a mitigated offer position because his status 
as an illegal alien prevented him from obtaining a license to op-
erate a motor vehicle. 150 
In sum, the damaging effects that Hoffman Plastic could poten-
tially have on the workplace injury rights of illegal immigrants 
have fortunately not been fully realized due to the hesitancy of 
many state courts to award it universal deference. However, 
many state courts have still found ways to penalize illegal immi-
grant workers for violations that IRCA squarely puts on their 
employers' shoulders. 151 While not accepting Hoffman Plastic's re-
strictions wholesale, these courts have used Hoffman Plastic's 
reasoning to empower themselves and juries to take immigration 
status into account in determining the amount of damages an in-
jured employee can receive. 152 For these courts, considering immi-
gration status in the damage determination process is a way to 
vindicate what they see as a conflict with federal immigration ob-
Aviles, No. B166839, Ventura Cnty. Super. Ct. No. 201488, 2004 WL 2385135, at *1, *4 
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2004) (conceding that while Hoffman Plastic does not 
preclude recovery for workplace injury, immigration status can preclude an undocumented 
street sweeper who was severely injured by a drunk driver from future wage recovery and 
obtaining vocational rehabilitation benefits). 
148. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 40, § 66.03[4][a]; see Cherokee Indus., Inc., 84 
P.3d at 801. 
149. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 218(8) (1991). 
150. Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 628 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Ga. App. 2006); see also 
Mora v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 845 A.2d 950, 954-55 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (allow-
ing an employer to suspend weekly wage benefits, but not medical benefits, if the injured 
employee was an unauthorized alien and referencing the doctrine established in Rein-
forced Earth Co., 810 A.2d at 108-09, that an illegal alien may be entitled to some bene-
fits, but if the employer seeks to suspend weekly disability benefits, the employer need not 
show job availability since the employee may not legally take any proffered employment). 
151. See, e.g., Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (N.Y. 2006). 
152. Id. 
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jectives.153 While workplace injury may not be completely barred 
altogether, limiting the amount and type of recovery allows these 
courts to effectuate a robust slap on the wrist of the injured em-
ployees. There are a number of problematic policy concerns with 
this practice. 
IV. IMMIGRATION STATUS SHOULD NOT BE USED TO LIMIT 
WORKPLACE INJURY RECOVERY154 
Workplace injury recovery, whether in the form of tort damag-
es or workers' compensation, should not be limited because of 
one's immigration status for three important reasons. First, 
awarding full damages and benefits supports, rather than un-
dermines, the nation's federal immigration objectives as ex-
pressed in IRCA. Second, there is no relationship between one's 
immigration status, an unrelated extrinsic characteristic, and the 
injury suffered. Third, the practice of limiting workplace injury 
recovery overlooks some significant policy considerations. 
A. Allowing Full Workplace Injury Recovery Supports Rather 
Than Undermines Our Federal Immigration Objectives 
The courts that have limited recovery to illegal immigrant 
workers by virtue of one's illegal status have done so under the 
assumption that limiting damages provides an incentive against 
illegal immigration, by punishing the alien for his or her illegal 
presence. 155 This assumption, similar if not identical to the Su-
153. See id. ("In any event, any conflict with IRCA's purposes that may arise from per· 
mitting an alien's lost wage claim to proceed to trial can be alleviated by permitting a jury 
to consider immigration status as one factor in its determination of the damages .... "); see 
also Madeira v. Affordable Rous. Found. Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 248-49 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (noting that the jury instruction allowing immigration status to be 
considered "in this case serves ... to preclude us from identifying the lost earnings award 
to Madeira as a 'direct and positive' obstacle to the attainment of IRCA's policy and pur· 
pose"). 
154. It is important to note that most of the policy arguments in this analysis pertain 
primarily, but not solely, to those situations in which the illegal immigrant commits no 
affirmative fraud or misrepresentation in the hiring process-as such false representation 
is an express violation of IRCA. Nevertheless, as reflected in Part IV.B, and as some 
courts have held, there is at least a viable argument that immigration status is completely 
irrelevant in a workplace injury claims regardless of false misrepresentation in the hiring 
process. See infra Part N.B. 
155. See infra note 225-26 and accompanying text. 
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preme Court's rationale in Hoffman Plastic, 156 rests on fundamen-
tally flawed footing. Although counterintuitive at first glance, 
awarding full damages to injured undocumented workers does 
not undermine federal immigration objectives. To the contrary, 
not limiting workplace injury recovery actually strengthens the 
federal immigration objective of reducing illegal immigration. The 
three primary reasons supporting this proposition are spelled out 
below. 
1. Illegal Immigrants Do Not Prominently Base Their Decision 
to Immigrate on the Likelihood of Workplace Injury Recovery 
Those courts, including the Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic, 
which have argued that limiting damages, or prohibiting them al-
together, creates an adverse incentive for illegal immigrants to 
immigrate are fundamentally mistaken. The soundness of their 
reasoning rests on the assumption that illegal immigrants actual-
ly contemplate the likelihood of workplace injury recovery in their 
decision to chase the "American Dream." However, illegal immi-
grants do not substantially base their decision to immigrate on 
the likelihood of future workplace injury recovery. 157 Consequent-
ly, any incentive created by the assurance of full workplace injury 
recovery is simply marginal. 
When illegal aliens decide to come to the United States, they 
often take significant risks and make great sacrifices along the 
way. 158 They do so with the hope of a better life and the hope that 
they will be able to somehow escape impoverishment. 159 While 
seeking the ultimate realization of the "American Dream," their 
focus is often narrow, predominated by the more temporal need of 
sustaining life or reuniting with loved ones. 160 If the illegal immi-
156. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (''Under 
the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the 
United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies."). 
157. See Michel Marizco, Are the Border Patrol's Deterrent Measures Working?, 
FRONTERAS (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/are-border-patrols-deter 
rent-measures-working. 
158. See Pena, supra note 8. 
159. fllegal Immigration from Mexico, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, http://www.usim 
migrationsupport.org/illegal-immigration-from-mexico.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) 
(noting that many individuals come to the United States from poverty stricken towns in 
order to achieve the "American dream" and that for many, employment at a low wage job 
provides a higher standard of living than in their home country). 
160. One commentator has recognized that illegal immigration will persist because 
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grant defeats the odds and makes it to the United States, he or 
she is often consigned, by necessity rather than by choice, to take 
employment in a low paying, labor-intensive, and dangerous 
job.161 Although the risk of serious injury or fatality is strikingly 
high in these jobs, they are often the only option for immigrants 
who lack proficiency in English and other skills. 162 
Because pursuit of a better life is paramount, illegal immi-
grants are not going to be deterred from taking high-risk em-
ployment simply because of the possibility that damages might be 
limited if a workplace injury occurs; rather, the decision to immi-
grate is based on more pressing, temporal needs which transcend 
any associated risks. 163 This principle was reinforced in a Con-
necticut Supreme Court decision in which the court found that 
"[p]otential eligibility for workers' compensation benefits in the 
event of a work-related injury realistically cannot be described as 
an incentive for undocumented aliens to enter this country ille-
gally."164 
A recent study by law professor Emily Ryo surprisingly found 
that the probability of arrest or criminal punishment is not a sig-
nificant deterrent for Mexican illegal immigrants. 165 Rather, Mex-
ican illegal immigrants base their decision to immigrate on more 
significant factors such as employment prospects in the United 
States and the ability to survive the trek across the United 
there are stronger forces at work than border fences: "[T]he more walls we put, [the] more 
technology, [the] more agents we put, people who find that they've got to cross-whether 
because they're starving [or] ... because they've got to come back and reunite with their 
families--they're going further and further out into the more dangerous areas." Carolina 
Moreno, Border Crossing Deaths More Common As fllegal Immigration Declines, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/17/ border-
crossing-deaths-illegal-immigration_n_l 783912.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161. NELP REPORT, supra note 11, at 1, 3. 
162. Id. 
163. Marizco, supra note 157. 
164. Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 404 (Conn. 1998); see also Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (''To permit the Board to award back-
pay could not significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force, for so speculative a 
future possibility could not realistically influence an individual's decision to migrate ille-
gally.") (Breyer, J., dissenting); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 
1988) (finding that procurement of employment at any wage, not the prospect of job-
related protections, attracts illegal immigrants). 
165. Threat of Arrest and Punishment May Not Deter fllegal Immigration, PHYS.ORG 
(Aug. 1, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-07-threat-deter-illegal-immigration.html [here-
inafter Threat of Arrest]; Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unau· 
thorized Migration, 78 AM. Soc. REV. 577 (2013), available at http://www.asanet.org/journ 
als/ASR/Augl3ASRFeature.pdf. 
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States-Mexico desert. 166 It follows logically that if severe punish-
ments like arrest and deportation are not sufficient deterrents, 
seemingly lesser punishments like the probability of a limited 
workplace injury damages award-if contemplated at all-cannot 
be said to be a stronger deterrent. 
Professor Ryo stated that her findings "suggestO that perhaps 
there is very little that immigration enforcement alone might be 
able to do to affect changes in people's intentions to migrate ille-
gally."167 So instead of heightened border enforcement or in-
creased deportations, Professor Ryo suggests that reducing illegal 
immigration, as long as that is the desired goal, could be better 
accomplished through lessening the strength of the United States' 
economic magnetic pull. 168 Applied through a workplace injury 
lens, these findings support the conclusion that limiting work-
place injury damages does very little to accomplish the goal of re-
ducing illegal immigration because it does not address the bigger 
picture: the employment disparity between the United States and 
countries such as Mexico.169 
Even if the recovery of full remedies for workplace injury were 
at the forefront of the mind of the average illegal immigrant, this 
would only serve as a marginal deterrent at best. Professor Ryo's 
study suggests that as long as the hope for a better life in the 
United States remains, illegal immigration will continue to per-
sist despite criminal or civil punishments. 110 Empirical data pro-
vides further support for this contention. In the year following 
Hoffman Plastic, the population of illegal immigrants in the 
United States was about 9. 7 million. 171 Throughout the next dee-
166. Marizco, supra note 157; RYO, supra note 165, at 592. 
167. Threat of Arrest, supra note 165. 
168. Among Ryo's specific suggestions was "to reallocate some of our current enforce-
ment resources to increasing ... employment-generating economic development of key [il-
legal immigrant] sending communities, which might make staying at home both an eco-
nomically-viable as well as a morally-acceptable option for prospective migrants." Id. The 
INS took a similar position in its surprising alliance with the NLRB in Hoffman Plastic. 
See supra note 59. 
169. See Dowling, 712 A.2d at 404 (quoting Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 
1997)) ("[T]here is no merit to the respondents' argument that providing workers' compen-
sation benefits to undocumented aliens would stand as an obstacle to 'removing the em-
ployment 'magnet' that draws undocumented aliens into the country."'). 
170. Ryo, supra note 165, at 585. 
171. PROCON.ORG, POPULATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE COUNTRY ILLEGALLY COMPARED 
TO THE TOTAL U.S. POPULATION, at Chart II [hereinafter PRoCoN.ORG], auailable at http:// 
immigration. procon.org/view .resource. php?resourceID=000844. 
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ade, this number steadily increased notwithstanding the Hoffman 
Plastic decision. 112 If limiting workplace injury recovery was in 
some way an effective deterrent, one would have expected to see 
this reflected statistically in the domestic population of illegal 
immigrants. 173 However, this has not been the case. 
In fact, the only period within the last decade where there was 
a major decrease in the illegal immigrant population was in 2009, 
after the height of the recent economic recession.174 Strikingly, 
from 2008 to 2009, the population of illegal immigrants in the 
United States declined by almost one million.175 This was no coin-
cidence, as the downturn of the economy was accompanied by the 
elimination of many employment sectors, like construction, that 
are mainstays for low-skilled illegal immigrant workers.176 When 
jobs were unavailable, notice of the hardship that many illegal 
immigrants within the United States were experiencing traveled 
quickly, persuading more illegal immigrants to stay home. 177 With 
the economy slowly pulling itself out of the Great Recession, stud-
ies suggest that the decline in illegal immigration that accompa-
nied the recent economic downturn has likely bottomed out, with 
the result being a continued increase in illegal immigration. 178 
One would assume that if the practice of limiting, but not com-
pletely prohibiting, workplace injury recovery had a real deter-
rent effect on illegal immigrants, illegal immigration would not 
have steadily increased in the years following Hoffman Plastic, 
especially when the practice of limiting workplace injury recovery 
172. Id. All the while, the number of deportations and removals have also steadily in-
creased in the decade following Hoffman Plastic. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 
923 tbl.9.1. In fact, right before the Great Recession, the number of unauthorized immi-
grants in the United States was close to 12.2 million. Jeffrey Passel & Ana Gonzalez-
Barrera, Populatwn Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW 
RES. HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.pewhispanic. 
org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed/. 
173. Of course, no statistical estimate of population can be totally accurate. Surely, 
there are some illegal immigrants not accounted for in all the data. However, one would 
still expect to see some measurable decline in the domestic population of illegal immi-
grants if the practice of limiting workplace injury recovery were truly an effective deter-
rent. 
174. PROCON.ORG, supra note 171; Passel & Gonzalez-Barrera, supra note 172. 
175. PROCON.ORG, supra note 171. 
176. Miriam Jordan, Rlegal Immigration to U.S. Slows Sharply, WALL ST. J. ONLINE 
(Sept. 1, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487038823045754657 
42670985642. 
177. Id. 
178. Passel & Gonzalez-Barrera, supra note 172. 
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gained traction. But, this is far from reality. The sheer number of 
illegal immigrants in the United States today is evidence alone 
that limiting damages for workplace injury is not an effective de-
terrent to illegal immigration, whereas eliminating employment 
opportunities has, at least, had some measurable effect. 179 
In short, workplace injury is a real risk that illegal immigrants 
face, 180 but it is not one that substantially affects the decision of 
whether to immigrate. Even if illegal immigrants substantially 
contemplated such risks, the persistence of illegal immigration is 
evidence alone that such risks are not strong enough to slow this 
magnetic pull. Empirical data has shown that illegal immigrants 
respond to other macroscopic forces, such as job availability. 181 
Because limiting workplace injury recovery does not substantially 
incentivize the illegal immigrant to stay in his country of origin, 
awarding full damages to illegal immigrants who suffer work-
place injuries does not provide any more incentive for the alien to 
immigrate. To the extent that it does, this incentive is inconse-
quentially marginal at best. 
2. Awarding Full Damages Provides More Incentives for 
Employers to Refrain from Hiring Illegal Immigrants 
Awarding full damages, and not limiting them due to one's 
immigration status, actually provides more incentive for employ-
ers to refrain from hiring illegal immigrants. From a purely fi-
nancial cost-benefit analysis, this point should be self-evident. 
Employers must pay for workers' compensation relief, and in suc-
cessful tort suits employers pay either out of pocket or through 
their insurance carrier. 182 Thus, employers shoulder the financial 
burden of injuries that occur under their stewardship. 183 Obligat-
ing an employer to compensate an undocumented worker's injury 
in full-something that the employer would otherwise be able to 
avoid by arguing that the worker's immigration status should 
179. See supra notes 170-7 4 and accompanying text. 
180. See NELP REPORT, supra note 11, at 3--4. 
181. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (noting that the establishment of 
workers' compensation schemes where the employer would be responsible to compensate 
irrespective of fault was a necessary trade-off for employers). 
183. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 876; see also supra notes 15, 20 and accompanying 
text (noting that IRCA was unambiguous in its emphasis of curbing illegal immigration 
through employer incentives). 
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limit the amount of relief available-prevents the employer from 
profiting, both procedurally and monetarily, from a technicality. 
Most importantly, by preventing the employer from using immi-
gration status as a scapegoat, the employer is forced to pay a 
higher price to compensate the illegal immigrant than they oth-
erwise would have to. Thus, this obligation to pay in full may very 
well be seen as an extra cost to the employer that it would other-
wise not have. 184 The result of this is an added financial incentive 
for employers to take more cautious measures to avoid the incur-
sion of any such extra costs, notably encouraging employers to 
comply with IRCA's mandate to verify immigration status in the 
hiring process and to refrain from hiring illegal immigrants in the 
first place. 
As opposed to raising concern for illegal immigrants, 185 the risk 
of having to pay full damages or benefits for workplace injuries 
that workers sustain while in the course of their employment is, 
or at least should be, at the forefront of the minds of employers. 186 
Employers, especially those whose trade or occupation is one 
where the risk of injury is high, should be thinking about this 
possibility when they hire workers. Any injury that the employer 
is responsible for compensating only adds to its overhead costs. In 
the absence of the added financial incentive that a full compensa-
tion requirement would create (one that the employer would feel 
directly), employers would have fewer reasons to carefully comply 
with IRCA's employment verification mandate. Thus, limiting the 
recovery that an undocumented worker can receive by virtue of 
his or her immigration status actually provides more incentive for 
employers to be less scrupulous in verifying immigration status 
in the hiring process, another requirement that IRCA places une-
quivocally on the employer.187 
184. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra Part IV.A 1. 
186. Cf Gomez v. F & T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, 842 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007) ("Given the status of the [construction] industry, it seems somewhat disingenu-
ous for contractors and owners to seek disclosure of the status of an employee after the 
employee has been injured under the guise of attempting to mitigate a lost wage claim, a 
concern which apparently neuer entered their minds when the work was bid out.") (empha-
sis added). 
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012); see also Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 
994, 1000 (N.H. 2005) ("To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible for an il-
legal alien's employment who knew or should have known of the illegal alien's status 
would provide an incentive for such persons to target illegal aliens for employment in the 
most dangerous jobs or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working conditions."). 
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Much of the case law supporting this contention has focused on 
the availability of recovery for illegal immigrants and not simply 
whether such recovery should be limited or awarded in full. Nev-
ertheless, the rationale for awarding full damages is simply a log-
ical extension of allowing recovery in the first place. In a case in-
volving an illegal immigrant nanny who sustained an injury in a 
fall in her employer's home, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
found that "excluding such [illegal immigrant] workers from the 
pool of eligible employees would relieve employers from the obli-
gation of obtaining workers' compensation coverage for such em-
ployees and thereby contravene the purpose of the Immigration 
Reform [and Control] Act by creating a financial incentive for un-
scrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers."188 In a 
more recent case, the Court of Appeals of Ohio rephrased this 
same point, holding that "[t]o refuse to allow illegal aliens injured 
on the job to recover ... would be to encourage the hiring of ille-
gal aliens and downgrade workplace safety."189 
These same rationales can likewise be extended to conclude 
that limiting the amount or type of damages that an illegal immi-
grant can recover effectuates the same dilemma of encouraging 
employer complacency and noncompliance in the hiring process. 
If an employer is able to pay limited damages or benefits, an in-
centive is created whereby employers-especially those who work 
in fields where there is a high risk of workplace injury-would 
naturally gravitate toward hiring illegal immigrants simply be-
cause they cost less. In this sense, the employer may take ad-
vantage of the independent enforcement practice of limiting dam-
ages as a means to cut overhead costs. Thus, having an illegal 
immigrant is a ''bonus" because it can translate into extra savings 
in the event of future workplace injury. Lower overhead costs 
translate into higher net profits, which will ultimately result in 
the hiring of more illegal immigrants. Therefore, awarding full 
damages not only financially incentivizes employers to comply 
with IRCA and refrain from hiring illegal immigrants in the first 
place, it also ensures that employers do not become unjustly en-
188. Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 404 (Conn. 1998). Compare Mendoza v. Mon-
mouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 225 (N.J. 1996) (finding that giving companies im-
munity from providing full compensation in workplace injury contravenes the policies of 
ffiCA), with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking down the denial of education 
to undocumented immigrants because the state's objectives were irrational, among which 
was protecting itself from an influx of immigrants). 
189. Rajeh v. Steel City Corp., 813 N.E.2d 697, 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
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riched through their ignorance of a duty that IRCA puts squarely 
on their shoulders. 190 
Some may argue that because employers already have a duty 
to pay full damages to authorized workers that suffer workplace 
injuries under their watch, employers are consequently not incen-
tivized further by the prospect of having to pay full damages to 
illegal immigrant workers who suffer workplace injury. However, 
this contention is flawed. Assuming that employers will act in 
their own pecuniary self-interest, most reasonable employers191 
who know that they can hire an illegal immigrant without being 
obligated to pay full damages if that employee suffers a workplace 
injury would prefer to hire an illegal immigrant over an author-
ized worker, all other considerations (that is, skill, knowledge, 
etc.)192 held equal. One would assume that most employers would 
take advantage of every potential savings in overhead costs be-
cause doing so would maximize the employer's net profit. 193 Thus, 
while it may be true that employers already are on notice that 
they will have to pay their citizen employees full damages or ben-
efits, ensuring that workplace injury recovery is not limited to in-
jured undocumented workers on the basis of immigration status 
prevents employers from taking advantage of immigration status 
to cut costs.194 By eliminating the ability for employers to use im-
migration status as a scapegoat, they will have no choice but to 
diligently adhere to IRCA's employment verification requirement 
190. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
191. Some altruistic employers might still prefer hiring a legal employee based on mor-
al principles. 
192. Excluded from this assumption is the prevalence of wage violations by employers 
of undocumented workers, an entirely separate discussion in itself. See Steven Green-
house, Low-Wage Workers Are Often Cheated, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at 
A12 (noting that low wage workers, including illegal immigrants, are routinely denied 
proper overtime pay and are often paid less than minimum wage). 
193. Moreover, if the civil penalties for hiring an illegal immigrant under IRCA were 
more widely enforced, this would also encourage employer compliance in refraining from 
hiring illegal immigrants for the same reason. The higher likelihood of incurring a civil 
pecuniary penalty would provide yet another financial incentive for the employer to be 
cautious in the hiring process. 
194. This reasoning can also be used to undermine another counterargument. Some 
may argue that the aforementioned incentive-based analysis is overemphasized, especially 
if employers are insured for workplace injury through private insurance. In these cases, it 
is true that the "out-of-pocket" expenses that the employer would otherwise have to pay to 
the injured worker would not be as direct or noticeable. Nevertheless, the employer would 
still have indirect costs through increased insurance premiums, especially those employers 
who are in the field with a high likelihood of workplace injury. Any increased costs will 
still ultimately be felt by the employer. 
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with every hire. 195 With this added incentive to comply with IRCA 
employment verification requirements, IRCA's immigration objec-
tives would be more fully realized. 
In sum, under a system where the recovery of damages may be 
limited by virtue of an employee's immigration status-as is the 
case with those courts which have not allowed recovery in full-
the incentive to hire illegal immigrants still exists regardless of 
whether an employer already subjectively expects to pay full 
damages if a workplace injury occurs. Therefore, awarding full 
damages provides more of an incentive for employers to comply 
with IRCA's prohibition of hiring illegal immigrants and ensures 
that noncompliant employers will not use illegal immigrants as a 
way to cut costs and maximize profits. If illegal immigrants are 
awarded full workplace injury recovery, employers will be disin-
centivized from hiring illegal immigrants and the availability of 
jobs for illegal immigrants will gradually decrease. Thus, the na-
tion's federal immigration objectives will be more fully realized 
because there will be less job opportunity for illegal immigrants 
and more aliens will be persuaded to remain in their home coun-
tries.196 
3. Awarding Full Workplace Injury Recovery Avoids the 
Dilemma of Compliant Employers Becoming Disadvantaged 
Aside from disincentivizing employers from hiring illegal im-
migrants, awarding full workplace injury recovery also has an-
other key benefit: it provides more protections for employers in 
the same field who otherwise adhere to IRCA's provisions of veri-
fying immigration status and refrain from hiring illegal labor. In 
other words, it solves the problem of compliant employers becom-
ing disadvantaged by a competitor's noncompliance. It does so by 
ensuring that noncompliant employers-those employers who do 
not affirmatively verify immigration status and do hire illegal 
immigrants-are not able to profit from their intentional or igno-
rant complacency. 
195. Employers would obviously still have a choice to willingly ignore IRCA's employ-
ment verification mandates, but in so doing, they would subject themselves to civil or 
criminal prosecution and/or penalties. See, e.g., Gomez v. F & T lnt'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, 
842 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300--01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
196. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing the need to more fully 
address the employment magnet force which drives illegal immigration as opposed to 
simply limiting workplace injury recovery); see generally supra Part IV.A. I. 
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Undoubtedly this problem has arisen in part because of the 
lack of widespread enforcement of IRCA's employment verifica-
tion mandate.197 In order to facilitate the accomplishment of this 
verification mandate, an electronic database known as "E-Verify'' 
was created wherein employers can check the work authorization 
documents an employee presents against government databases 
in order detect an individual's unauthorized work status. 198 Be-
tween 2006 and 2010, fourteen states enacted laws requiring 
state agencies and contractors to use E-Verify. 199 In four states, all 
employers within the state were required to use E-Verify.200 How-
ever, notwithstanding these efforts, only four percent of employ-
ers were using E-Verify in 2010, and in that year, nearly eighty 
percent of all hires in the United States were made without veri-
fying employment through E-Verify. 201 Thus, although the E-
Verify program has seen an increase in use since its implementa-
tion, its potential is far from being realized. 
The result of this lack of uniformity across similar sectors of 
employment means that some employers who are noncompliant 
with IRCA and E-Verify are able to hire cheaper illegal labor.202 
And because many of the major employers of undocumented 
workers are in the sectors of the economy that typically provide 
lower wages and more dangerous conditions, they can profit by 
not having to pay full damages in cases where an illegal immi-
grant employee is injured on the job, to the disadvantage of em-
ployers who do not hire illegal immigrants. These noncompliant 
employers can not only potentially save significant amounts of 
money by paying limited amounts of damages and benefits to the 
197. Especially in the years immediately following the passage of IRCA, the employer 
sanctions contained therein were only rarely enforced, with the number of employers ac-
tually sanctioned for violations never exceeding 1000 for any single year. ADRIANA 
KUGLER & PATRICK OAKFORD, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION 
REFORM WILL BENEFIT AMERICAN WORKERS 2 (2013), available at http://www.american 
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/KuglerEmploymentBrief-1.pdf. 
198. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 965. E-Verify was piloted in the late 1990s and 
both Congress and the Executive Branch have since expressed the desire to strengthen the 
system, starting with the emphatic support of the Bush administration and followed by 
that of the Obama administration. Id. at 965-66. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 966. 
202. I reference this "cheap labor" both in the sense of the employer not being obligated 
by minimum wage mandates, as well as the savings in overhead costs which result from 
being able to pay less than full damages in the event of workplace injury. 
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injured employee,203 but also easily replace cheap labor with other 
cheap labor as if these undocumented individuals were metal cogs 
in their business machines. And as E-Verify is currently under-
enforced, these noncompliant employers can reasonably do so 
without any fear that IRCA's required civil sanctions or criminal 
penalties will be administered.204 
Basic principles of supply and demand dictate that these em-
ployers would serve as a magnet to undocumented workers who 
would not be able to find employment with employers who are 
compliant with IRCA and E-Verify.205 With this subsequent pull, 
the compliant employers face a significant pecuniary disad-
vantage in being obligated to pay full workers' compensation 
damages to an employee should that employee suffer any work-
place injury.206 
For example, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose 
Company A and Company B are both employed in road construc-
tion in a small rural town near the United States-Mexico border. 
Both companies are in a state that allows illegal immigrant 
workers to recover workplace injury compensation, but limits the 
amount of damages that such individuals may receive due to 
their inability to "legally mitigate" damages through obtaining 
lawful employment. Company A is compliant with IRCA and E-
Verify, and inquires into each prospective employee's immigration 
status prior to hire. However, due to certain socio-demographics 
of this particular town, the supply for authorized labor is very 
low. The supply for unauthorized labor is very high because the 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 187-90. 
204. See KUGLER & OAKFORD, supra note 197 at 2; see also Design Kitchen & Baths v. 
Lagos, 882 A.2d 817, 826 (Md. 2005) (noting the concern that denying workplace injury 
recovery would seriously undermine the state's significant interest in encouraging em-
ployers to maintain safe workplaces and lead employers to assume that they can "engage 
in unsafe practices with no fear of retribution, secure in the knowledge that society would 
have to bear the cost of caring for these injured workers'} 
205. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. This magnet is exactly what the IRCA 
was enacted to prevent in the first place. See Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 
184, 187 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (referencing that the IRCA was "enacted to reduce 
the influx of illegal immigrants into the United States by eliminating the job magnet"). 
206. Not to mention, it is a disadvantage by being bound by state minimum wage laws. 
See REBECCA SMITH & AMY SUGIMORI, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, UNDOCUMENTED 
WORKERS: PRESERVING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AFTER HOFFMAN PLASTICS COMPOUNDS V. 
NLRB 2 (2003), http://nelp.3cdn.net/b378145245dde2e58d_Oqm6i6i6g.pdf (referencing a 
2000 U.S. Department of Labor Study survey which found that one hundred percent of all 
poultry processing plants, a major employer of illegal immigrants, were non-compliant 
with federal wage and hour laws); supra text accompanying note 190. 
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economic production in this town is significantly better than the 
nearest border town. Nevertheless, Company A hires an author-
ized United States citizen knowing that should injury befall this 
employee, Company A would have to compensate the injury in 
full. To the contrary, Company B is noncompliant with E-Verify 
and takes advantage of the fact that its state has not vigorously 
enforced E-Verify compliance for all employers. Thus, not worried 
about workers' compensation obligations, Company B hires an 
individual who is unauthorized to work in the United States. 
Both employees from each company suffer a debilitating work in-
jury in their employment and file for workers' compensation bene-
fits. 
Company B is in a better financial situation after the work-
place injury, all other things held equal.201 Company B does not 
have to pay the same benefits that Company A does to the injured 
employee. Furthermore, Company B can simply rehire from an 
already high supply of unauthorized labor and continue in its 
business venture quickly. On the other hand, Company A is obli-
gated to pay full damages to its injured employee and has a sig-
nificantly more limited pool of authorized United States citizens 
to choose from. Due to this scarcity of supply, Company A might 
experience delays in returning to the level of business output that 
it had before the employee's injury. Company B subsequently 
profits from the ability to be noncompliant with E-Verify and 
from avoiding the obligation to pay full damages. Furthermore, 
with the extra savings from not being obligated to pay full dam-
ages in cases of workplace injury, Company B has lower overhead 
costs and can reduce the prices of its products and services. The 
obvious result of this is that Company B can now take advantage 
of the natural draw to lower prices and attract significantly more 
clients. With this larger volume of clientele that comes to Compa-
ny B because of the lower prices, Company A is even further dis-
advantaged. 
Although a hypothetical, this situation is a reality for many 
small business owners. A strengthened E-Verify system does 
have its own costs, but compliant small business owners are like-
207. For purposes of this hypothetical and comment in general, this does not take into 
account the real likelihood that such employers are also not likely paying minimum wages 
to their illegal immigrants, thus having even more savings for lower overhead costs. See 
supra text accompanying notes 187-90. 
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ly to see these costs to be worth the price in order to prevent their 
competitors from profiting off of their refusal to "play by the 
rules." For example, one small business owner who runs a power-
washing business in Delaware said, "I am tired of losing work to 
people who cheat the system and undercut my prices because 
they don't have the same overhead as I have because I follow the 
rules .... I am for [a strengthened E-Verify system] simply be-
cause in the long run it will help my business."208 The savings that 
noncompliant employers could have from avoiding paying full 
damages could be crippling to competing employers who abide by 
the law. If states allow courts to limit damage recovery to injured 
documented workers, this really works to the economic and pecu-
niary detriment of those employers who do not hire undocument-
ed workers in the first place. Noncompliant employers should not 
be able to take advantage of this nuance to maximize their prof-
its, especially if doing so will further disadvantage employers who 
obey the law.209 Thus, eliminating the arbitrary judicial practice of 
limiting workplace injury recovery because of one's immigration 
status encourages more widespread compliance with IRCA and 
consequently reinforces equality among economic competitors. 
In conclusion, awarding full damages to illegal immigrants who 
are injured in the course of their employment is more supportive 
of IRCA's purpose than limiting damages. Illegal immigrants do 
not prominently base their decision to immigrate on the likeli-
hood of workplace injury recovery and thus will not be marginally 
deterred from immigrating by limiting the amount and type of re-
covery for workplace injuries. Also, awarding full damages or 
benefits actually provides more incentives for employers to re-
frain from hiring illegal immigrants. Lastly, awarding full dam-
ages or benefits also ensures that noncompliant employers cannot 
profit from their noncompliance to the disadvantage of their law-
abiding competitors. 
208. Devon Merling, Debating the Costs of E-Verify, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865590414/Debating-the-costs-of-E-Verify.html. 
209. This logic circles back to the first two sub-sections discussed above in Part IV.A 
Having to pay full damages to injured undocumented workers, employers will have less 
incentive to hire them in the first place because they will not be able to profit from having 
to pay less, should workplace injury occur. And if an employer's incentives to hire illegal 
immigrant workers are eliminated, there will be more uniform compliance with the IRCA's 
text and purpose. With that, there will be fewer jobs available for illegal immigrants and, 
consequently, a greater probability that illegal immigration will be realistically reduced. 
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B. No Sufficient Causal Relationship Exists Between an 
Employee's Injury and the Employee's Immigration Status 
1407 
Aside from the incentives analysis discussed above, limiting 
compensation damages and benefits to undocumented workers 
who are injured in the course of their employment does not make 
sense from a causational standpoint because an employee's immi-
gration status is hardly relevant to the injury that the employee 
suffered. In other words, there is not a sufficient causal relation-
ship between the injury suffered and the individual's immigration 
status to justify limiting damages. 
In the majority of cases, an individual's injury has little to do 
with immigration status. Either in personal injury tort litigation, 
where a jury must decide the amount of damages, or in a no-fault 
workers' compensation dispute, it is not clear why immigration 
status is at all relevant or necessary for determining the amount 
of relief to which an individual is entitled.210 In fact, it is very dif-
ficult to imagine any scenario in which an individual's immigra-
tion status has any direct relevance to an injury suffered in the 
course of one's employment. An immigrant's status can be neither 
an actual or proximate cause of an injury. An individual's immi-
gration status is exactly that: a status. It is not a tangible, intrin-
sic characteristic. It is a legal classification.211 In this sense, limit-
ing recovery based on immigration status alone is akin to limiting 
workplace injury recovery due to one's religion or sexual orienta-
tion, which would seem completely at odds with notions of equali-
ty and fundamental fairness. 
Interestingly, the courts that have employed this relevance ra-
tionale to justify limiting workplace injury recovery have often 
been faced with factual situations where the illegal immigrant 
worker affirmatively submitted fraudulent work documents.212 
210. Cf Mondragon, supra note 6, at 477 (arguing that employers ought to not be able 
to pry into immigration status following an injury in order to threaten or retaliate against 
their undocumented employees). 
211. See generally Visas: Documentation of Immigrants and Nonimmigrants-Visa 
Classification Symbols, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,517 (Nov. 25, 2009) (illustrating the extensive use 
of one's immigration status as a "classification"). 
212. E.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 
2006) (finding that an undocumented subcontractor contracted employment absent any 
affirmative use of false identification); Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 
326 (Minn. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs immigration status only became an issue after 
the injury); cf Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (N.Y. 2006) (citing 
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Among the reasons the courts have used for allowing general re-
covery is that the initial fraudulent conduct, using false work au-
thorization documents, is not directly connected, and is thus ir-
relevant to, the injury giving rise to the workplace injury claim. 213 
Logically applying this rhetoric to cases where the illegal immi-
grant did not use any fraudulent means to obtain employment, 
one may alter this analysis slightly and conclude that the initial 
fraudulent conduct of the employee (mere unauthorized presence 
instead of tendering false work documents) is not directly con-
nected, and is thus irrelevant to, the injury giving rise to the 
workplace injury claim. 
One example among the post-Hoffman Plastic cases where this 
rationale has been used to allow recovery of benefits is Correa u. 
Waymouth Farms, Inc. 214 In Correa, an undocumented worker 
sustained a work-related injury and was awarded workers' com-
pensation lost wages and medical benefits. 215 He also partially 
mitigated damages by returning to Waymouth Farms and per-
forming light-duty work while still receiving benefits.216 However, 
Waymouth Farms later found out that Correa was never author-
ized to work in the United States and terminated him. 217 In the 
subsequent fight over discontinuation of compensation benefits 
due to Correa's immigration status, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court refused to allow discontinuation.218 Among other things, it 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002)) ("IRCA does not 
make it a crime to work without documentation. Hoffman [Plastic] is dependent on its 
facts, including the critical point that the alien tendered false documentation that allowed 
him to work illegally in this country."). 
213. E.g., Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 58 AD.3d 44, 54 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008). In fact, even before Hoffman Plastic, this relevance/causal-connection argu-
ment was not completely foreign to courts. See, e.g., Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 479 
S.E.2d 773, 775 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding an award of weekly indemnity benefits to 
an injured illegal worker following a workplace injury because "Dynasty failed to ... 
showO a causal connection between Beltran's misrepresentation and the injury he suf-
fered''); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A2d 221, 224-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996); Billy v. Lopez, 434 S.E.2d 908, 911 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). 
214. 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 2003). 
215. Id. at 326. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 325. 
2014] AWARDING FULL WORKPLACE INJURY 1409 
held that entitlement to compensation and benefits was not con-
ditioned upon the showing of lack of work authorization or immi-
gration status, but upon "the establishment of a causal link be-
tween the work-related disability and the inability to find and 
hold a job."219 
Thus, some courts have hesitated to completely prohibit recov-
ery to illegal immigrants absent a showing that the injured work-
er's undocumented status is somehow related to the injury suf-
fered. 220 And while these cases have dealt with the issue of illegal 
immigrants' right to recover generally, there is nothing barring 
its application to the issues of the amount and type of recovery 
available. If it does not make sense to bar recovery for workplace 
injury by virtue of an extrinsic, intangible characteristic that is 
wholly unrelated to the activities which caused the injury, then 
limiting the amount of damages recoverable due to that intangi-
ble extrinsic characteristic is similarly nonsensical.221 
There is another problematic consequence for using an extrin-
sic, intangible characteristic as a means to limit workplace injury 
damages. Inherent in the effectiveness of workers' compensation 
is the notion of no-fault recovery. 222 Workers' compensation 
schemes were established under the operative theory that if an 
individual is injured, he or she should be able to recover for their 
injury regardless of who was ultimately at fault. 223 If immigration 
219. Id. at 330 (emphasis added). Another example of a similar result is Rajeh v. Steel 
City Corp., 813 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). In that case, an alien who had been found 
to be "deportable" by an immigration judge following a drug conviction suffered a work-
related injury while his deportation was pending. Id. at 698-99. The appellee employer 
asserted that because the undocumented worker's criminal conviction led to his inability 
to work legally, this precluded his ability to recover for the workplace injury suffered. Id. 
at 702. The Ohio appellate court rejected this contention on an attenuation theory, revers-
ing the denial of benefits because the alien was an employee within the meaning of the 
state workers' compensation statute. Id. The criminal activity was too far removed from 
the workplace injury suffered and the alien had done nothing, notwithstanding his immi-
gration status, to cause himself to be excluded from coverage under the statute. See id. at 
702-05. 
220. This principle is also lucidly demonstrated by those states who have explicitly or 
implicitly declared that the right to recovery has very little to do with whether an individ-
ual has a green card. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
221. See also infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining that if the majoritarian practice has been to 
refuse to let immigration status completely bar workplace injury recovery to illegal immi-
grants, it does not make sense to limit that recovery based on that immigration status). 
222. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 24, at§ 1.01. 
223. See id. at § 1.03 ("The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: 
Was there a work-connected injury? Negligence, and, for the most part, fault ... cannot 
affect the result. Let the employer's conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the em-
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status becomes an exception to the no-fault requirement and em-
ployers are allowed to skirt around this bright-line operative poli-
cy, one can see that this might present a slippery slope. For ex-
ample, if employers are allowed to use immigration status as a 
means to avoid having to compensate for injury in full, arguments 
might be made for the application of other similar exceptions that 
may be wholly unrelated to the injury, such as pre-existing condi-
tions. Adding exceptions for certain characteristics, especially 
ones that do not have a satisfactory connection to the workplace 
injury, complicates the efficacy of workers' compensation laws. 
Although it may not be explicit in every illegal immigrant 
workplace injury case, one's immigration status has little rele-
vance when deciding the right to recover for injury. In short, 
there is rarely, if ever, a situation where one's immigration status 
plays a factor in the injury that gives rise to a workplace injury 
claim. And if the lack of a causal connection between immigration 
status and the alleged injury is not a ground to warrant the re-
covery of damages in the first place, it logically follows that such 
individuals are deserving of full recovery of damages. 
C. The Practice of Limiting Damages Has Other Serious Negative 
Public Policy Effects 
The courts that have prohibited recovery based on immigration 
status or have limited it altogether also overlook some other im-
portant considerations. Borrowing the Supreme Court's rationale 
in Hoffman Plastic,224 some courts have emphasized that limiting 
damages is justified because the illegal immigrant's employment 
is rendered invalid due to his illegal presence in the United 
States. 225 It would appear that these courts limit benefits because 
ployee's be abysmal in its clumsiness ... if the accident arises out of and in the course of 
the employment, the employee receives an award."). 
224. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (''Under the 
!RCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the 
United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies."); 
id. at 150-51 ("Similarly, Castro cannot mitigate damages ... without triggering new 
IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by finding employers 
willing to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers."). 
225. Sometimes this argument comes in the form that the illegal immigrant cannot 
mitigate damages by obtaining lawful employment after the injury. See Madeira v. Afford-
able Haus. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 248 (2d Cir. 2006); Balbuena v. IDR Realty 
LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (N.Y. 2006); Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 
518 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). But see Cherokee Indus., Inc. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798, 801 
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to do otherwise would ignore the moral wrong the alien might 
have committed through his illegal presence in the country.226 In 
other words, these courts seem to limit damages because award-
ing full damages would condone illegal immigration, which is un-
desirable as a matter of policy. However, this rationale does not 
consider a number of countervailing policies, including: (1) but for 
the injury, the illegal immigrant would still be employed with 
their employer; (2) imposing limits on the type or amount of dam-
ages recoverable, without a legal justification for doing so, is arbi-
trary; and (3) the argument that limiting damages reflects the il-
legal immigrant's inability to mitigate damages is misplaced and 
overemphasized. 
1. But for the Injury, the Illegal Immigrant Would Still Be 
Working at His or Her Job 
Perhaps one of the more obvious policy reasons for awarding 
full damages to undocumented alien workers who suffer work-
related injuries is that, but for the injury, the illegal immigrant 
would still be working at his or her job. In this sense, limiting the 
recovery of damages based on immigration status punishes only 
one party, the alien worker, for his or her illegal presence, but 
completely ignores the employer's fault in employing the illegal 
immigrant. The injury shifts from being a tragic accident that 
might permanently affect the ability of an individual to earn a 
livelihood into a "lucky break" for an employer who should have 
known better. If we assume that the employment of illegal immi-
grants is the evil sought to be remedied, IRCA is clear and une-
quivocal about the burden it places on employers to enforce illegal 
immigration.221 Even assuming arguendo that the alien is morally 
at fault for his or her illegal presence, the greater fault under the 
law lies with the employer.228 Therefore, allowing the employer to 
escape full liability essentially condones an activity for which the 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (adopting the majority's approach in Hoffman Plastic and recogniz-
ing that an illegal immigrant's inability to stay in the country may warrant the limiting of 
certain vocational rehabilitation or medical remedies). 
226. See supra note 152-53 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
228. It is not a violation of the law for an illegal immigrant to be employed in the Unit-
ed States; however it is illegal for an employer to knowingly hire an illegal immigrant or 
continue to hire an illegal immigrant once their alien status has been disclosed. See supra 
notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
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employer alone is responsible under the statutory language of 
IRCA, and that would have presumably continued were it not for 
the injury. 
Assuming employers are driven to maximize profits,229 one can 
conclude that unless an injury occurs, or there are other reasons 
to terminate an illegal immigrant worker (for example, poor work 
performance), the employer will continue to employ that individ-
ual. Doing so makes the most economic sense from the standpoint 
of the employer because it takes time and money to replace an 
employee.230 This was demonstrated in a pre-Hoffman Plastic 
case, Billy v. Lopez, where an illegal immigrant affirmatively 
misrepresented his immigration status for employment and then 
sustained a severe spinal cord injury, which made him a paraple-
gic. 231 After the injury and the disclosure of the illegal immi-
grant's affirmative fraud, the employer testified that even if he 
had known about Lopez's previous false misrepresentation, he 
still would have employed Lopez ''because [he] was a good work-
er."232 The Virginia appellate court used this rationale in part to 
reject the employer's claim that Lopez's award was not meritori-
ous due to his immigration status. 233 
In short, limiting damages based on immigration status brings 
an ironic, unintended consequence. It condones an action that the 
employer alone has full responsibility to prevent; an action that 
should not happen in the first place and one that would have oth-
erwise continued absent the injury. Although the illegal immi-
grant may have committed some wrong malum in se by their un-
authorized employment, in the majority of cases, they have 
229. Cf Gomez v. F & T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, 842 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300-01 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007) ("Notwithstanding an employer's exposure to certain risks under IBCA ... 
[these risks are] insufficiently high to deter the hiring of undocumented immigrants."); see 
id. at 301 ("Given the status of the [construction] industry, it seems somewhat disingenu-
ous for contractors and owners to seek disclosure of the status of an employee after the 
employee has been injured under the guise of attempting to mitigate a lost wage claim, a 
concern which apparently never entered their minds when the work was bid out."). 
230. Suzanne Lucas, How Much Does It Cost Companies to Lose Employees?, CBS 
NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.cbs.news.com/news/how-much-does-it-cost-companies-
to-lose-employees/. 
231. 434 S.E.2d 908, 909 (Va. App. 1993). 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 911. After stating that "[t]here [was] simply no evidence in the record that 
Lopez's alien status was in any way related to the consequent injury," the court held that 
because Billy testified that he still would have employed Lopez, the illegal immigrant 
would still be working for Billy but for the injury. Id. 
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committed no wrong malum prohibitum. A workplace injury 
should never become a ''lucky break" for an employer to escape 
full liability for failing to fulfill its obligation under the law. 
2. Imposing Limits on the Type or Amount of Damages or 
Benefits Recoverable, Without a Legal Reason for Doing So, Is 
Arbitrary 
Awarding full damages and benefits is nothing but a simple, 
logical extension of the widespread practice of awarding damages 
in the first place. In other words, if the majority practice in most 
jurisdictions is to allow the recovery of damages, imposing limits 
on the type or amount of damages recoverable, without a legal 
reason for doing so, is arbitrary. As discussed at length in Part 
III, nearly forty-eight jurisdictions have refused to read IRCA as 
preempting state workers' compensation laws.234 Moreover, many 
state courts have refused a wholesale application of Hoffman 
Plastic's broad holding to all workplace injury cases. 235 Notwith-
standing these decisions, in allowing injured undocumented 
workers to recover generally, many state courts have been able to 
limit the amount or type of relief available based on immigration 
status.236 
If damages are generally recoverable, then any limitation 
based on an individual's immigration status is an arbitrary en-
forcement, especially given the fact that one's immigration status 
is an extrinsic, intangible characteristic entirely unrelated to the 
injury in the majority of cases. 237 Awarding full damages in these 
cases is not extreme or liberal overreaching; it is a logical baby 
step. If immigration status should not preclude recovery general-
ly, using immigration status to limit recovery is an unnecessary 
and arbitrary contradiction of the right to recover in the first 
place. 
234. See supra Part III.A. 
235. See supra Part 111.B. 
236. See supra Part 111.C. 
237. See supra Part IV.B. 
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3. The Argument That Limiting Damages Is Justified Due to the 
Alien's Inability to Mitigate Damages Is Misplaced and 
Overemphasized 
Many defend the practice of limiting workplace injury damages 
to illegal immigrants under the theory that, as an illegal immi-
grant, the alien cannot lawfully obtain employment and "mitigate 
[his] damages."238 This argument largely borrows from the Su-
preme Court's language in Hoffman Plastic that it is "impossible 
for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United 
States without some party directly contravening explicit congres-
sional policies."239 This, however, is a misguided contention. 
It is not impossible for undocumented workers to mitigate their 
damages by obtaining other employment under the law, nor is it a 
foregone conclusion that the illegal immigrant will never be able 
to work in the United States again. 240 An illegal immigrant may 
mitigate damages and become employed in a number of ways, in-
cluding self-employment or through his development of independ-
ent contractor skills such as roofing or plumbing.241 
A New York court in Gomez v. F & T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC 
noted the flaws in the mitigation of damages argument. 242 Indeed, 
the Gomez court referenced the Balbuena court's decision, which 
limited damages due to the inability to mitigate and described the 
assumption upon which that decision rested as fallacious. 243 The 
Gomez court said: 
238. Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 2003). 
239. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002). 
240. See supra notes 20-22 (explaining that IRCA has done nothing to delineate that 
illegal immigrants may never be employed in the United States and only prohibits the 
employer from knowingly hiring such an individual or continuing to employ such individ-
ual once the alien's status is disclosed). 
241. And even in a number of workplace injury cases, mitigation is not even possible 
due to the seriousness of the injury. See Gomez v. F & T Int'l (Flushing, NY) LLC, 842 
N.Y.S.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). In other words, when the workplace injury is so 
severe that it renders the individual physically unable to work, the alien's legal inability 
to obtain employment is a non-issue. 
242. Id. (citing Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (N.Y. 2006)). 
243. Gomez, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 303; see also id. at 301 ("Given the status of the [construc-
tion] industry, it seems somewhat disingenuous for contractors and owners to seek disclo-
sure of the status of an employee after the employee has been injured under the guise of 
attempting to mitigate a lost wage claim, a concern which apparently never entered their 
minds when the work was bid out."). 
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[M]itigation encompasses an employer proving that the injured em-
ployee cannot obtain employment in New York or the USA, but only 
in his country of origin. The fallacy of this mitigation argument, 
however, is that the construction industry, especially the sector that 
does demolition, would re-employ [the injured employee] without 
hesitation because of the very fact that he is undocumented and the 
employer may feel that it can pay less and not accord him the protec-
tion of the Labor Laws. 244 
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After then addressing other policy concerns that prohibiting 
damages altogether might create,245 the Gomez court said "[i]f de-
fendants can somehow demonstrate that the demolition industry 
has all of a sudden agreed to abide by IRCA such that [the in-
jured employee] could not obtain demolition work without proper 
authorization, the Court might reconsider its ruling. But, we all 
know better."246 Thus, the Gomez court recognized that the mitiga-
tion argument is not based in reality. Viewed in this light, the 
practice of limiting damages appears to be a judicially created 
method to vindicate what may be a moral transgression by an il-
legal immigrant, but what is not a violation of current federal 
immigration law. 
Ultimately, the mitigation argument deserves a more thought-
ful analysis than a premature finding that simply because an in-
jured undocumented worker is an illegal immigrant, he or she 
cannot ever be employed lawfully in the United States. Mitigation 
is not necessarily impossible.247 And when, under IRCA, "the onus 
is on the employer to make sure that it is hiring a person author-
ized to work," the benefit of any doubt should not simply be 
granted to the employer by virtue of an individual's immigration 
status.248 Rather, the tide should turn the other way, especially 
when awarding full damages to the injured alien provides more 
incentives for the employer to comply with IRCA249 and prevents 
the problem of competitors within the same industry becoming 
disadvantaged for obeying the law.250 
244. Id. at 302 (emphasis added). 
245. For example, employers might seek retaliation after the individual's immigration 
status surfaces or threaten to report the alien for deportation, tearing families apart. See 
Mondragon, supra note 6, at 465-67. 
246. Gomez, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 303 (emphasis added). 
247. See id. 
248. Id. at 301. 
249. Supra Part N.A.2. 
250. Supra Part N.A.3. 
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D. Desired Change Must Be Accomplished Through Necessary 
Means 
In our system of government, legislative power is vested in 
Congress. The legislative branch is the only branch of govern-
ment that can enact new laws or amend existing laws. 251 If it is 
necessary to vindicate the moral impropriety of an undocumented 
immigrant's presence or subsequent employment, this is not for 
the courts to determine. If there is a desire to criminalize the em-
ployment of such individuals, this change must be accomplished 
through the means prescribed in the Constitution. The judiciary's 
role is to interpret the law and apply it to a specific case or con-
troversy. 252 A court should not confuse its role in administering 
the law with creating or modifying the law. Under the current 
law, it is not a per se criminal offense for an alien to be present or 
even work in the United States253 and it is the employer's sole re-
sponsibility to diligently enforce unlawful employment of illegal 
immigrants.254 The propriety of this burden placement must be 
decided, and arguably has been decided, by the people. 
While some progress has been made, there is no question that 
our immigration objectives would certainly be served by a 
strengthening of the E-Verify system and its more widespread 
implementation.255 Encouraging widespread adoption of E-Verify 
would undoubtedly help reduce illegal immigration.256 This com-
ment has attempted to demonstrate that awarding full damages 
to undocumented immigrant workers who suffer work-related in-
juries would also strongly aid in the realization of these goals. 
When courts take it upon themselves to vindicate what they per-
ceive to be an illegal activity, which is not in fact illegal, by limit-
ing the recovery of damages to such individuals, it hinders the re-
alization of those objectives. If the current law is not a reflection 
of the people's will, it must be modified through legislation and 
not by the judiciary. 
251. See U.S. CONST. art I,§ 1. 
252. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
253. Supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
254. Supra notes 16--19 and accompanying text. 
255. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Em-
ployment Verification with Administration's Commitment to E-Verify (July 8, 2009), 
available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/08/administration-commits-e-verify-streng 
thens-employment-verification. 
256. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For many of the seven million illegal immigrant workers 257 who 
have heeded the call to enter by the "golden door"258 in search of a 
better life here in the "nation of immigrants,"259 the light of Lady 
Liberty's torch is extinguishing. Employers and state courts alike 
have been tempted by the Supreme Court's Hoffman Plastic deci-
sion260 to conclude that illegal immigrants have absolutely no 
workplace rights, including the right to recover for workplace in-
jury. Fortunately, many jurisdictions have been reluctant to com-
pletely bar recovery. 261 Nevertheless, many of these same jurisdic-
tions have condoned the practice of limiting the amount of 
damages recoverable to injured illegal immigrant workers by vir-
tue of their immigration status.262 This practice imposes a debili-
tating reality upon individuals who have, in more ways than one, 
risked their very lives chasing the "American Dream." 
No one can deny that the wave of illegal immigration in recent 
decades has created its fair share of problems to which there is no 
easy solution. However, the practice of limiting recovery to in-
jured undocumented workers has in no way aided the realization 
of the nation's end goal of deterring illegal immigration. Aside 
from the policy flaws of this practice, 263 awarding full benefits to 
injured illegal immigrants better serves our federal immigration 
aims by encouraging more widespread compliance with the law264 
and limiting the ways in which noncompliant actors may take ad-
vantage of their noncompliance for their personal financial en-
richment.265 The independent judicial efforts to prevent illegal 
immigration by limiting workplace injury recovery based on an 
employee's immigration status not only frustrate the accom-
plishment of our federal immigration objectives, but also extin-
257. Eduardo Porter, fllegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security with Billions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at Al; Press Release, House Judiciary Committee, Smith Ap· 
plauds E-Verify Expansion (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index. 
cfm/2012/2/smithapplaudseverifyexpansion. 
258. LAzARus, supra note 3. 
259. See President John F. Kennedy, supra note 1. 
260. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
261. Supra Part III.B-C. 
262. Supra Part III.C. 
263. Supra Part IV.C. 
264. Supra Part IV.A.2. 
265. Supra Part IV.A.3. 
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guish the beacon which has unquestionably brought so much po-
litical and social richness to our country. Although it may seem 
counterintuitive at first glance, awarding full damages and bene-
fits to injured illegal immigrants will, in the long run, help reduce 
illegal immigration, help foster a more vibrant and just society, 
and kindle the dimmed light of our most important national sym-
bol and ideal. 
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